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Policy measures to encourage recovery of private investment in
Zimbabwe should focus not on measures to raise current  profits
but on measures  to relieve supply-side  constraints, to reduce per-
ceived risk, to clearly  define the rules of the game for foreign in-
vestors, and to create a more favorable environment for invest-
ment decisionmaking.
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FINnacl  POlICY  and Systems 
The response of private investment is central to  and important, but should be cast in a broader
the effectiveness of adjustment measures in  context.  Policy measures should be geared
bringing about structural change and sustained  toward:
growth - but there is little analysis of this issue
for Africa.  * Relaxing supply-side constraints.
In some African countries there is little or no  * Reducing perceived risks.
indigenous busincss sector, in many, foreign
corporations play an important role.  Zim-  *  Defining new, clearer rules of the game.
babwe's business sector is relatively well-
developed by African standards - and since  * Facilitating investment decisionmaking.
there is a working stock exchange, the accounts
of much of it are in the public domain.  * Encouraging the underl  nig  demand for ex-
panding capacity.
This study focused largely on the behavior
of this part of the private sector - in the context  *  Improving incentives for investment to be
of overall determinants of private investment.  economically efficienL
Dailami and Walton conclude that no simple  *  Dealing with the ownership issue.
policy shift will initiate and sustain the recovery
of private investment in Zimbabwe.  The reasons  *  Creating a supportive macroeconomic envi-
for weak private investment are complex.  ronmenL
Adjustments in conventional areas are unlikely
to work when the problem also lies in the overall  Toge-ther  these measures would constitute a
environment for investment decisionmaking  Mnd  radical shift in the business environment - one
intangible perceptions of future risk.  that need not lead to an unwarranted rise in
either the foreign share of profits or the share of
The govermment's current focus on the  foreign capital in the economy.
guidelines for foreign investment is appropriate
This  paper is a product of the Financial Policy and Systems Division, Country
Economics Department, and the Country Operations Division, Southern  Africa
Department.  Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington DC 20433. Please contact Maria Raggambi, room N9-031, extension
61696 (64 pages with charts and tables).
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings  of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research
Complex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.
Produced at the PPR Dissemination CenterTable  of Contents
1.  Introduction . ................................................  1
2.  Private  Investment  in the  Hacroeconomy  ....................... 4
The  Historical  Pattern  of Investment  .....  ..............  4
Determinants  of Private  Investment  ...............  7
Implications  for  the  Future  ......................  13
3.  The  Structure  of Corporate  Finance  ...........................  16
Sources  and  uses  of Funds ..............................  16
The  Structure  of the  Financial  System  .....  .............  21
Explaining  the  Pattern  of Finance  ......................  23
The  Future  Demand  for  Debt .............................  25
4.  Rates  of  Return  and  the  Cost  of Capital  ......................  28
Profitability  and  the  Rate  of  Return  on  Capital  ........  30
The  Cost  of Capital  ....................................  36
5.  The  Regulatory  Framework  for  Corporate  Investment  ....  ...... 41
Foreign  Capital  and  Government  Policy:
A Strategic  Interaction  ..........................  41
Domestic  Investment  Regulation  and  Foreign  Exchange
Allocation  .......................................  45
6.  Policy  Conclusions  ...........................................  47
A. The  Macroeconomic  and  Financial  Framework  ....  .......  48
B. Foreign  Exchange  and  Supply-side  Constraints  .... .....  50
C. Investment  Appraisal  ................................  52
D. Financial  Sector  Development  ........................  53
E. Complementary  Regulatory  Issues  .....  ................  55
F. Tax  Policy  ..........................................  56
G. The  Environment  for  Foreign  Investment  .....  .........  58.
Annex  1  Derivation  of the  Cost  of Capital  ........  ..................  61
References  .........................................  63
The  authors  wish  to  thank  Bela  Balassa,  Ajay  Chhibber,  Alan  Gelb,  Stewart  Kufene,
Sam  Malaba,  Lloyd  McKay,  Diana  Mutangwazi  and  Wayne  Thirsk  for  comments,  and  Tony
Hawkins  and  Brian  Conheady  for  wcrk  study  and  data  collection,  and  Vargha  Azad
and  Carl  Webber  for  research  assistance.Ta,bles
1.1  Corporate  Investment  Outlays,  1980-87  ........................  2
2.1  Results  of  an Econometric  Analysis  of the
Determinants  of Private  Investment  .....  ................  9
2.2  Projected  Investment  Requirements  for  the  Mining  and
Manufacturing  Sectors  in 1995 .......................... 14
3.1  Financing  Sources  of Non-Financial  Corporations,  1980-87  .....  17
3.2  Uses  of Funds  of Non-Financial  Corporations,  1980-87  .........  18
3.3  Self-Financing  over  Fixed  Investment  Ratios
Local  and  Foreign  held  Companies  ....................... 18
3.4  Composition  of Corporate  Business  Assets  in
Selected  Countries,  1983 .............................  19
3.5  Projected  Financing  Requirements  for  Various  Investment
Expansion  Scenarios,  1987-1992  ......................... 26
4.1  Simulating  the  Impact  of Alternative  Investment  Incentives
on the  Required  Return  on a Project  ....................  29
4.2  Estimates  of Pre-tax  Rate  of Return  on Capital  Employed  for
Local  and  Foreign  Non-financial  Corporations,  1980-87
4.3  The  Dist-ibution  of Business  Operating  Income  into  its
Components  1980-87  .....................................  35
4.4  Estimates  of  After-tax  Return  on Shareholders'  Equity  for
Local  and  Foreign  Non-financial  Corporations,  1980-87  35
4.5  The  Real  Effective  Cost  of Debt  for  Local  and
Foreign  Non-financial  Corporations,  1980-87  ....  ........  37
6.1  Issues  and  Policy  Areas  for  Private  Investment  Recovery  ...... 47
Figures
2.1  Real  Fixed  Investment,  1968-87  ............................... 5
2.2  Private  and  Public  Fixed  Investment  ..........................  5
2.3  The  Composition  of Private  Fixed  Investment,  1980-84  .........  6
2.4  The  Composition  of Public  Fixed  Investment,  1980-84  ....  ......  6
2.5. Real  Change  in  GNP  and  Private  Fixed  Investment  ....  ..........  11
2.6  Real  Private  Investment  and  the  Relative  Price
of investment  goods  ........................  11
3.1  The  Ratio  of Internal  Funds  to  Fixed  Investment
in  the  Corporate  Sector  ....................................  20
3.2  Financial  Assets  of Selected  Countries  ....................... 22
4.1  The  Industrial  Share  Price  Index,  1975-88  .....  ...............  32
4.2  The  Real  Cost  of Capital,  Local  and
Foreign  Companies,  1980-87  .................................  40
4.3  The  Relationship  Between  the  Real  Cost  and  Acquisition
Price  of Capital,  1980-87  ........................  401.  nITRODUCTION
1.1  The  continued  sluggish  behavior  of corporate  business  investment
in  Zimbabve  is  a  major  source  of  current  concern. With the  exception  of
the  short-lived  economic  boom  of the  early  1980s,  business  fixed  investment
has, since  independence,  been  depressed  and  has  experienced  a  significant
decline  over  the  past  few  years. This  decline  has  been  particularly
pronounced  in  the  investment  patterns  of large  companies  and  among  these
especially  foreign  controlled  ones (see  Table  1.1). Given  the  dominant
role  of these  companies  in  the  country's  total  business  investment
activity,  their  reluctance  to invest  has  prompted  serious  concern. At
stake  is  not  just  the  current  economic  recovery,  but  also  the  prospects  for
future  growth  in  output  and  employment,  and  the  effectiveness  of any
structural  adjusttAent  measures. Both  t'he  Government  of Zimbabwe  and the
business  community  are  keenly  avare  of the  present  situation  and  the
implications  that it  may  hold for  the  future. There  is,  hovever,  less
agreement  about  the  underlying  causes  about  the  required  policy  measures  to
support  an investment  recovery.
1.2  The  present  weakness  of investment  demand  in  Zimbabve  is due  to  a
range  of socio-political  and  economic  factors,  divided  broadly  into  three
categories:  (i)  supply-side  factors,  related  primarily  to shortage  of
foreign  exchange  necessary  for  imports  of essential  capital  goods  and
industrial  inputs;  (ii)  excessive  administrative  intervention  in  the  areas
of investment  decision  making,  labor  relations,  and  price  controls;  and
(iii)  socio-political  factors  reflecting  the  country's  history,  strategic
location,  and  political  evolution. There  is  no easy  way to  disentangle  the
influence  of these  factors  or to  establish  their  quantitative  dimensions.
Some  of these  factors  are  not  amenable  to  quantification  and  their
influence  cannot  be assessed  within  the  conventional  models  of private
investment  behavior.'  Yet,  their  importance  is  underlined  by the  fact  that
conventional  indicators  of investment  incentives,  such  as  profitability,  a
supportlve  tax  incentive  scheme,  and  the  lack  of any  apparent  financial
constraint,  have  been  rather  favorable  in  recent  years.
L  Analysis  of  private  investment  behavior  is  difficult  and  controversial,
even in ideal  situations  when  the  influence  of political  and  strategic
factors  are  not considered. The controversy  among  various  approaches
to  determinants  of  private  investment  in  industrial  countries,  which  has
persisted  in  the  economic  literature  over  the  past  fifty  years,  is  one
manifestation  of the  intractability  of assessing  how investors  respond
to changes  in the  underlying  economic  and  financial  environment. See
for  instance,  Abel (1980)  and  Shapiro  (1986),  for  further  discussion.-2-
Table  1.1  Cornorate  investment  Otulays.  1980-1987
(current  and 1980  prices)
Total  Large  Corporations  A/
Private  Investment  Nominal  Real  b,
Year  Nominal  Real  Foreign  Local  Total  Forelan  Local  Total
1980  366  366  75  46  121  75  46  121
1981  593  516  170  47  217  148  41  189
1982  523  397  152  54  206  115  41  156
1983  512  316  66  50  116  40  30  70
1984  649  339  49  9  58  26  5  31
1985  554  240  101  59  160  44  25  69
1986  697  266  172  72  244  66  27  93
1987  700  242  160  108  268  55  37  92
/  All  48  Corporations  Listed  in the  Zimbabve  Stock  Exchange.
hi  Deflated  by investment  price  deflator.
Source: Zimbabwe  Stock  Exchange.
1.3  A comprehensive  view of  business  investment  in  Zimbabwe  needs  to
take  account  of four  basic  factors: (i)  the  desire  for investment;  (ii)
the  availability  of funds  to  pay for  the  investment;  (iii)  the  cost  of
capital,  including  the  influence  of the  incentive  system;  and (iv)  the
regulatory  and  institutional  environment.  The  desire  for  investment  is
related  to  macro  and  structural  factors  that  underlie  the  companies'
motives  for  business  expansion,  cost  reduction  or replacement,  and renewal
of aging  and  obsolete  machinery  and  equipment. The  availability  of funds
depends  on the  level  of internal  cash  generation,  on the  willingness  and
capacity  of firms  to  raise  funds  externally,  and,  of course,  on  planned
investment.  The incentive  system  embraces  both  the  various  inducements  of
tax  shields,  accelerated  depreciation  schemes,  interventions  on interest
rates,  guaranteed  finance  that  governments  resort  to ir order  to stimulate
investment  expenditures  and interventions  on resource  allocation  that  also
affect  the  incentive  for  investment  These  interact  to  affect  the  cost  of
capital  and  so the  required  rate  of return  for  new investment.  These  three
factors  are,  to a large  extent,  complementary  to  each  other.  Ample  supply
of funds  and  generous  incentives  would  not  necessarily  lead  to  higher
investment  outlays  if firms  lack  motives  or reasons  for  such  an expansion.
Alternatively,  lack  of an appropriate  incentive  system  could  frustrate  the
desire  for  investment,  even  if finance  is  not a  binding  constraint.
Finally,  the  financial  constraint  could  be  binding  when  both  desire  and
incentives  are  favorable.
1.4  Investment  desire,  incentives  and  finance  interact  within  a
regulatory  and institutional  framework. Such  a framework  defines  the
ground  rules  and  determines  the  degree  of autonomy  that  businesses  can
exercise  over  the  crucial  areas  of project  selectic:1,  project  approval,
labor  relations  and financing,  and  dividend  policies. Such  a degree  of- 3  -
autonomy  bears  strongly  upon  the  potency  of the  incentive  system.  For
instance,  generous  depreciation  allowances  are  less  effective  if investment
decision  making  and  implementation  processes  are  constrained  by  excessive
government  intervention.
1.5  This  paper  assesses  the  determinants  of  business  investment  in
Zimbabwe  in  the  four  areas  outlined  above.  The  quantitative  analysis  of
the  corporate  sector  covers  the  local  and  foreign  c'ompanies  that  are  listed
in  the  Zimbabwe  Stock  Exchange  (ZSE),  for  which  reliable  balance  sheet  and
income  expenditure  data  are  available  for  1980-87.  This  constitutes  a
small  sample  in  terms  of  number  (only  forty  eight  companies),  but  a  group
that  is  critical  in  terms  of  both  share  of  total  business  capital  formation
and  economic  function.  These  are  generally  large  companies  with  an
intensive  network  of  production  and  distribution  activities  in  the  mining,
manufaeturing,  construction,  and  retail  sectors.  They  account  in  aggregate
for  slightly  more  than  one-half  of  the  private  business  investment,  and
their  total  capital  assets  measured  at  book  value  amounted  at  the  end  of
1987  to  about  Z$  2  billion  or  20  percent  of  GDP.
1.6  The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  divided  into  five  parts:  Chapter  2
presents  the  macro  context  for  private  investment  and  the  results  of  an
econometric  investigation  of  determinants  of  private  investment;  Chapter  3
analyzes  the  pattern  of  corporate  finance  in  Zimbabwe,  highlighting  the
self-financing  characteristic  of  the  corporations;  Chapter  4  provides  an
analysis  of  the  present  investment  incentive  system  in  Zimbabwe,  including
an  analysis  of  the  cost  of  capital  in  Zimbabwe;  Chapter  5  discusses  the
regulatory  framework  for  domestic  and  foreign  firms;  and  Chapter  6  pulls
together  the  conclusions  of  the  analysis  for  government  policy.  Finally,
Annex  I  discusses  the  determination  of  the  marginal  cost  of  capital  for  the
non-financial  corporate  sector.-4-
2.  PRIVATE IvhYSTMENT  IN THE MACROECONONY
The  Historical  Pattern  of  InvMaS: 
2.1  The  private  sector  has  accounted  for  half  or  more  of  total  fixed
investment  in the  past.  It  has  had  two  principal  characteristics:  first,
i  has  experienced  sharp  fluctuations  in response  to  changes  in  the  overall
level  of economic  activity;  and  second,  it  has dominated  investment  in  the
goods-produtcing  sectors.
2.2  The  variation  in total  fixed  investment  since  1968  is illustrated
in Figure  2.1.  There  have  been two  major  peaks:  in the  major  oxpansion  of
the  early  1970s  and  in the  short  post-independence  boom  of 1981-82. There
has  been  a significant  subsequent  decline--to  the  real levels  prevailing  in
1972-73--and  only  a  weak recovery  following  the  agriculture-led  expansion
in  economic  output  of 1985.  Figure  2.2  then  gives  the  breakdown  between
private  and  public  fixed  investment 2. This  reveals  that  the  variations  in
private  investment  have  been sharper:  the  decline  in  private  investment
started  in 1982,  before  public  investment,  and the  subsequent  depression
has  been  deeper,  to an investment  level  below  that  prevailing  in  1970  or
1979,  that  was the  trough  of the  previous  depression.  There  also  appears
to  have  been  a shift  in the  overall  composition  of investment:  the  private
sector  accounted  for  about  60  percent  of the  total  through  1981  but for
less  than  half subsequently.
2.3  The  relatively  sharp  decline  in  private  investment  has
implications  for  the  sectoral  pattern  of investment.  As Figures  2.3  and
2.4  show,  there  are  radical  differences  in the  composition  of private  and
public  sector  investment.  The  private  sector  dominates  investment  in the
goods-producing  sector:  in the  1980-84  period,  manufacturing  and  mining
accounted  for  over  half of total  private  investment  and  agriculture  for  a
further  15  percent. This  represented  only  minor  changes  from  the
composition  in the  1970s;  it  reflects,  of course,  the  predominance  of
private  sector  ownership  of the  capital  stock  in these  sectors. The  public
sector,  by contrast,  has  mainly  invested  in  economic  infrastructure  and,  to
a lesser  extent,  public  services. At least  until  1984,  the  public  sector
has accounted  for  a small  fraction  of total  investment  in  the  goods-
producing  sectors.
2.4  This  pattern  of a relative  predominance  of the  private  sector  in
the  goods-producing  sectors  suggests  these  have  been  particularly  adversely
affected  in the  post-1982  investment  decline. This is  worrisome  in  view  of
the  critical  role  of these  sectors  for  future  growth. Both  government  and
other  analysis  has  documented  how  post-independence  growth  in  production
has  been to  a large  extent  associated  with  growth  in services--with  the
i.  The  Central  Statistical  office  only  publishes  a  breakdown  of  investment  up to
1984:  this  paper  used direct  estimates  of public  investment  (from  budgetary
and  parastatal  sources)  and  derived  private  investment  as  a  residual  for  1985-
87.Vipae 2.1
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exception  of  bumper  agricultural  years. 3 Inadequate  investment  levels  ln
the  goods-producing  sectors,  especially  in the  mid-1980s,  further
jeopardizes  future  growth  from  this  source.
2.5  The  final  descLiptive  point  of importance  here concerns  the  large
role  of corporations  within  the  private  sector  in  Zimbabwe. The  business
sector  accounts  for  the  bulk of investment  in  mining,  manufacturing,
construction  and  finance,  and  is  also important  in trade  and  transport. In
agriculture,  commercial  farmers  and  some  businesses  account  for  most
recorded  in,estment,  while  the  smallholder  investment  that  has occurred  has
probably  largely  gone  unrecorded. Small-scale  and  household  enterprises
play  a  relatively  small  role  in other  sectors,  but  probably  a rising  rolc
in  the  urban  informal  sector;  again  it is  likely  that  much  of this  activ 4
is  going  unrecorded.
Determinants  of Private  Investment
2.6  To provide  t'e-  overall  context  for  the  behavior  of -. he  business
sector,  the  study  und. took  an econometric  analysis  of the  determinants  of
private  investment  for  the  1968-87  period. This is  essentially  an  analysis
of the  relationship  between  investment  and  national  income,  using  an
extended  accelerator  model,  with  the  hypothesis  that  the  principal  economic
determinants  of private  investment  would  be expected  to lie  in three  areas:
expectations  on the  requirements  for  capacity  expansion  to  meet  future
growth  in  sales  (that  would  drive  the  underlying  desire  for  investment);
the  cost  of investing  for  domestic  and  foreign  investors-'-including  the
price  of investment  goods;  and  relative  price  factors  that  could  influence
the  expected  profitability  of investing.  In addition  to  these
determinants,  we also  explored  possible  changes  in the  environment  for
foreign  investors. This  is  not  a complete  model  of investment  behavior--
this  would  require  both dealing  with the  simultaneity  between  output  and
investment  determination  and  a full  specification  of the  supply  side.  Some
supply-side  factors  were  explored  in the  econometric  analysis,  and  are
briefly  reported  on  here,  and  a  more  rigorous  approach  is  planned  for
follow  up.work.
2.7  The  following  approach  was  adopted  to the  major  variables.
(i)  Income  and  capacity. Expected  future  sales  were  generally  captured
by the  use  of changes  in current  national  income. 4 There  is  no direct
indicator  of capacity  utilization  so thi-  was  explored  by alternative
indirect  measures,  including  constructe '.ndices  of overall  utilization  in
the  economy--from  either  the  ratio  of  actual  to trend  GDP  or a derived
4/  See  for  example  Government  of Zimbabwe,  (1986).
'All  the  results  reported  are  based  on  changes  in  GNP;  similar  results  were
obtained  when  GDP was  used.  The  influence  of  the  external  terms  of  trade
-- that  affect  national  income--was  also  explored,  but  the  results  were  not
significant  and  are  not  reported.- 8  -
capital  stock  series--and  total  intermediate  imports  (on  the  grounds  that
the  short-run  output  is  import-c(,nstrained).
(ii)  The  cost  of  zapital.  It  is  argued  in  Chapter  3  that  the
appropriate  formula  for  the  cost  of  capital  should  take  account  of  three
factors--the  cost  of  borrowing,  the  cost  of  capital  goods  and  the  cost  of
equity,  with  risk  factors  playing  a  large  role  in  the  last.  It  is  also
concluded  there  that  the  cost  of  capital  is  quite  different  for  domestic
and  foreign  investors.  It  is  not  possible  to  construct  a  long  enough  time
series  for  the  full  synthetic  estimate  of  the  cost  of  capital  to  be  used
for  estimation  purposes;  however,  it  was  feasible  to  use  measures  of  the
domestic  cost  of  borrowirv;  and  of  the  relative  price  of  investment  goods
(obtained  froh  the  implicit  investment  deflator  in  the  national  accounts)
for  domestic  investors.  We then  used  the  yield  on  long-term  bonds  in  the
UK as  an  indicator  of  the  opportunity  cost  for  foreign  investors.5
(iii)  Relative  prices.  Two areas  of  possible  influence  were  explored.
First,  wages  may  exert  an  influence  through  the  indirect  impact  on
profitability;  they  may  also  affect  the  capital  intensity  of  new
investment.  Second,  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  was  explored  for  the
possible  influence  on  the  profitability  of  the  tradeable  goods  sectors
(which  accounts  for  a  large  portion  of  total  private  investment  as  Figure
2.3  showed.)
(iv)  Other  influences  on  foreign  investors.  In  addition  to  the  foreign
cost  of  capital,  we  explored  the  possible  influence  of  changed  expectations
on the  environment  for  investment,  notably  on  remittability  of  profits  and
dividends,  through  using  dummies  for  1980  (for  independenoe  and  a  rise  in
the  level  of  remittdbility  for  most  firms)  and  1984  (when  remittability  was
cut  for  pre-1979  investments,  with  a  reportedly  broader  imeact  on
perdeptions  of  the  business  environment).
2.8  Table  2.1  provides  the  results  of  a  number  of  alternative
specifications  using  ordinary  least  squares.  These  are  all  based  on  a  log-
linear  investment  function--a  linear  formulation  was  also  explored  but  with
greatly  inferior  results.  The  results  reveal  a  highly  plausible  account  of
private  investment  behavior  with  significant  coefficients  with  the  expected
signs  for  most  of  the  major  variables.  The  core  of  the  dynamics  lies  in
the  strong  relationship  between  investment  and  changes  in  GNP, with  a
coefficient  generally  close  to  1.8,  and  lagged  investment.  The  effect  of
the  cost  of  capital  is  then  of  particular  interest.  The  real  foreign
interest  rate,  converted  into  Zimbabwe  dollars,  is  significantly  negative,
5The  real  rate  of  return  in  both  British  and  Zimbabwean  currency  terms  was
explored:  the  former  woula  be  relevant  for  new  investment  of  a  British
firm  ani  the  latter  for  the  re-investment  of  retained  earnings  of  a  firm
already  in  Zimbabwe.  The  former  was  insignificant,  but  the  latter  highly
significant--see  below.  It  would  be  preferable  to  use  an  index  of  the
alternative  rate  of  return  on  investment--in  the  UK  or  in  competing
countries  for  the  investment  for  multinatiorals-  -we are  implicitly  assuming
well-functioniri  capital  markets  in  the  UK.Table  2.1  Relt-  of  a  Eootric  Anelyisi  of  the  DItraifnateOf  Privte  Investment.  1910-19*?
Chang  i;n  -variable.  related  to  the  cost  f  capital--
Effut.on  Constant  log  @W  log  on  leoe  G  le e10  le  loIg  lA  M  loge  WAE log  PQCf  112  DW
1.  loe  PS  9.0  1.3  -1.0  0.3  0a  1.S
(3.6)  (2.3)  1)  (S  .)
2.  leog  PCfC  3.1  1.t  -1.3  0.5  0.75  2.2
(3.5)  (2.0)  (-2.9)  (3.3)
3.  log  PFf  3.1  1.e  -1.4  -1.1  0.5  0.77  2.1
(3.7)  (3.2)  (-3.2)  (-14)  (3.3)
4.  log  FCF  S3.  1.S  -1.1  -0.  4  -1.0  0.4  0.71  2.1 
(4.0)  (3.2)  (-2.4)  (-1:6  (-1.7)  (3.21
. lee  PFF  2.7  1.3  -1.0  0.3  0.3  0.10  2.0
(1.6)  (2.2)  (-2.0)  (0.6)  (1.1)
. log  PFrCF  3.9  1.S  -1.1  -0.2  0.4  0.  7  2.0
(2.6)  (2.4)  (-1.7)  (-.0)  (2.1)
Note
1-etetitice  aer  given  in  parenthee.
PCFCF  *  Priva  oe  fined  capital  foration  defleted  by the, iav"etat  deflater
W  Sd'  deflated  by  Cd  deflator
G  A  Real  long  tore  goernment  bond yield  in  Ut  edjueted  for  th  chlag  is  ZSjPeo_d  EacChang tet.
The nminal  rete  is  deflated  by  GOP  deflator  end je  calculated  by  "h  f*ermuls  1-  1AtWI6POEF
*  Differential  rate  betee.  governmnt  bond yild  in  UK adjuasd  for  heo  chang  ia  TZ/Pound emchange  rate  an  internal  rate.
It  hee been entered  in  the  form  (1Il)
aPri  e  Relative  price  of  capital  good  - Investment  *Aflator/MP  deflaour
RitR a Reel  intereet  rates  The nminal  intereet  rate  deflated  b-  %he CPS. clcu  latd  by  the  formuls  1.r/1.cpi
RE  a real  effective  *echange  rate
WAGE a  Reel eas;  nominal  wage deflated  by 0P  deflatow
QCf;I  *  Lgged  dependent variable  (one period)- 10  .
as is  the  relative  price  of capital  goods,  while  the  domestic  interest  rate
has  the  right  (negative)  sign  but is  generally  insignificant.  This  is
consistent  with the  view that  there  are  two  groups  of investors  within
Zimbabwe:  foreign-controlled  firms  are  influenced  by perceptions  of the
opportunity  cost  of investment  as  measured  here  by the  U.K. interest  rate.
Quite  good  results  were also  obtained  using  the  difference  between  the  U.K.
interest  rate (exchange  rate  adjusted)  and  the  domestic  interest  rate.
(The  fact  that  surplus  profits  cannot  be expatriated  in the  short  run  makes
no difference  to the  argument,  since  this  will  still  provide  a meaeure  of
the  perceived  future  cost  of a long-term  investment  decision). However,
neither  foreign  nor  domestic  firms  borrow  significantly  domestically  to
finance  investment  (see  Chapter  3) and  the  domestic  interest  rate  is  only
of  weak  significance.  The relative  price  of capital  goods  is,  on the  other
hand,  an important  variable  for  all  investors--this  is further  analyzed  in
the  assessment  of the  cost  of  capital  in  Chapter  4 and  Annex  1.
2.9  Both  the  real  wage and  the  real  exchange  rate  were generally
insignificant  (including  in formulations  with lags). This  is  probably  a
reflection  of the  dominance  of quantitative  controls  and  regulations  in
these  areas,  though,  to the  extent  the  exchange  rate  influences  exports  it
would  be expected  to  have  an indirect  influence  on investment  through  an
increased  supply  of imports. These  results  remain  useful,  since  they
indicate  that the  Government  does  not  need  to  be too  concerned  about  the
consequences  for  investment  of  changes  in these  variable  to  meet  other
objectives.  There  is  some  uncertainty  over  the  exchange  rate  since  this
would  be expected  to influence  the  relative  price  of investment,  in  view  of
the  relatively  high import  content  of investment.'  6However,  historically
the  effect  of changes  in import  prices  appear  to  have  been swamped  by other
determinants  of this  relative  price--that  we hypothesize  are  associated
with restrictions  on supply. Thus  if exchange  rate  depreciation  were
associated  with increased  availabilities  of capital  goods,  any  adverse
price  effects  should  be moderated  or reversed. It  would,  of course,  be
important  to  monitor  this.
2.10  Finally,  the  use  of  dummies  for  changes  in  the  business
environment  in 1980  and  1984  had  no significant  impact--an  interesting
result  that  suggests  neither  a sharp  break  in the  behavior  of the  private
sector  at independence,  nor  any  major  effect  on investment  of the  changes
in the  level  of remittability  in these  years.  (That  does  not  mean  that
variations  in  remittability  are  unimportant--it  is  argued  in  Chapters  5 and
6 that  they  are--only  that  the  specific  changes  did  not  have  an additional
short-run  impact).
2.11  Two  of the  main  relationships  are  illustrated  further  in  Figures
2.5  and  2.6. The first  clearly  shows  why the  coefficient  on income  is
high--in  the  two  major  cycles  that  occurred  in the  period  in question,
private  investment  has fluctuated  sharply  in response  to  changes  in
6Fixed investment  has, on average,  an import  content  of about  40 percent
compared  with  about  20 percent  for  other  expenditures.^  Ul -
Pigott  2.3
R.a1 Chanqe  in  GNP and  Private  Fixed Investment






70 Itl  72 73 74  75 76 77 76  79  60  6l  62  X3 64  45  6  56
-ON,P  at  *arlXet  pricos
Private  fixed  inv.s  atnt
figuro  2.6
Real  Private  Investpent  and  the  Relative




85  :  _ 225
70  100
7  7723  i4  75  7  76779  808  82  3  4 85 8617
Rttio ot  Inv.  def.  to  GDO det.
p.lv.  fixed inv.,  at  1980  ZS5000- 12  -
national  income. As we know  from  previous  analysis  on the  economy,  this  is
in  part  because  total,  and  especially  private,  investment  has
characteristically  borne  the  brunt  of adjustment  when the  emergence  of
macroeconomic  imbalances  or external  liquidity  constraints  have forced  the
Government  to  make  macroeconomic  corrections.  This implies  the  econometric
results  cannot  be interpreted  as a simple  demand  relationship.  On the
supply  side,  the  adjustment  has  generally  been  effected  through  cutbacks  in
import  allocations  for investment,  rather  than  any  squeeze  via the
financial  system. Conversely,  in the  two  major  upswings--of  the  early
1970s  and  the  beginning  of the  1980s,  there  has  been  both  a need  to  catch
up with  previously  postponed  investment  and  a relatively  large  relaxation
in the  import  constraint. It should  be noted  that  in  both  cases  it is
reasonable  to suppose  the  recovery  in  output  was  expected  to  be sustained--
in the  early  1970s  because  of the  strength  and  extent  of the  period  of
growth,  and  in the  early  198Cs  because  of the  strong  general  improvement  in
expectations  after  independence.  The stock  market  index  reached  a record
high in  1980 (see  Figure  4.1).  By contrast,  the  short-lived  recovery  in
1985  was  entirely  due  to  an excellent  harvest  and  was associated  with only
a  moderate  and  temporary  recovery  in investment.
2.12  Figure  2.6  then  shows  the  rise  in the  relative  price  of
investment:  here the  two  periods  of sharp  increase,  in the  late  1970s  and
the  mid-1980s,  coincide  with  periods  of contraction  of  private  investment.
While  some  secular  rise  in the  relative  price  of capital  goods  may  occur
over the  long  term,  this  is  an unusually  large  and  rapid  increase.  I/  As
noted  above,  the  most  plausible  explanation  in the  Zimbabwean  context  is
that  restrictions  in  the  supply  of capital  goods  (effected  by tightened
import  rationing)  have  been  reflected  in their  relative  price. This
account  is  consistent  with the  workings  of the  price  control  system,  that
is  based  on allowable  mark-ups  for  most  products--such  a system  is  much
more  effective  in  moderating  price  increases  for  relatively  homogeneous
commodities  and  very  difficult  for  engineering  products.
2.13  Supplv-side  factors. As noted  above,  the  supply  side  was  not
rigorously  treated,  but  we did  explore  the  influence  of import  variables.
The  principal  supply-side  constraint  in the  system--as  everybody  in
Zimbabwe  emphasizes--is  the  rationing  of imported  capital  goods  within  the
administrative  allocation  system. This  was  also  explored  as an independent
2/  As noted  in para.  2.9 this  is  not due to real  exchange  rate  movements--
the  relative  price  of investment  rose  much  more rapidly  than  the  average
border  price  of imports  of  manufactures  in  domestic  currency. Note  that
the econometric  results should be  treated with caution, since the
investment  deflator  is also the index  used to deflate  nominal  private
investment.  For  this  reason,  we systematically  explored  the  influence  of
other  variables  with the  relative  price  of investment  excluded.- 13  -
variable.  tJ  Both  imports  of capital  goods  (a  proxy  for  government
allocations  under  the  foreign  exchange  allocation  system)  and indicators  of
the  overall  level  of foreign  exchange  availability  addeca  slightly  to the
overall  explanatory  power  of the  equations,  with a  marginally  significant
positive  impact  on private  investment.  As noted  in  footnote  9, it is
unconventional  to treat  this  as an exogenous  factor,  but this  is  justified
in  Zimbabwe  because  of the  import  rationing  system:  the  Government  decides
on the  foreign  exchange  allocation  for  this  purpose. While  it is  probably
only "weaklyw  exogenous  (i.e.,  polity  decisions  will  be influenced  by other
factors,  including  changes  in income)  it is appropriate  to  have it as  an
independent  variable. It is  actually  surprising  that  it  has as little
explanatory  power  as indicated  in the  equations,  but there  are  two
important  interpretations  of this:  first,  the  resultant  scarcity  in  capital
goods  is  already  partially  captured  in  their  relative  price;  and,  second,
despite  the  obsession  with  import  rationing  within  Zimbabwe  other
factors--sales  expectations,  business  confidence  and the  cost  of  capital--
are  of equal  or greater  importance  for  the  level  of  private  investment.
The latter  point  is  a major  theme  of this  paper.
Implications  for  the  Future
2.14  The  results  reported  above  are  quite  good  in econometric  terms
and they  support  the  view  of a  private  sector  that  responds  to  underlying
economic  variables. The  overall  explanatory  power  of the  equations  is
surprisingly  high in  view  of the  evidence  from  firms  on the  importance  of
other  factors  on investment--including  perceived  risks  and  regulations.
However,  this is  consistent  with the  absence  of  major  changes  in these
structural  aspects  of the  business  environment  over  the  period;  the
negative  resuLts  on the  tests  for  changes  at independence,  and  the  highly
significant  constant  term,  also  support  this  conclusion.  Although
valuable,  the  results  should  be treated  with  caution  for  any forward-
looking  analysis. Apart  from  the  customary  caveats  with the  results  of an
analysis  with limited  data,  is  was suggested  that  the  strength  of the
relationship  between  private  investment  and  national  income  derives  in  part
because  of the  nature  of the  cycle  and  macroeconomic  adjustment  process.
It  would  be foolhardy  either  to predict  that  a rise  in  GDP  alone  would  lead
to a  sustained  rise in  investment  of the  strength  indicated  by the
equation  results,  or that  cuts in  the  relative  price  in investment  goods
would  have  a similar  effect. The  private  business  sector's  investment
behavior  is (unfortunately)  much  more  complex  than  that,  and  the  Government
will  have to  deal  with a range  of other  factors  in  supporting  an investment
recovery. Indeed,  much  of the  remainder  of the  report  is  devoted  to  a more
detailed  account  both  of some  of the  key factors  influencing  the
explanatory  variables  in  the  estimated  equations  (for  example  the  financial
A/  This is,  of  course,  the  opposite  of the  normal  direction  of  causation,  in
which  the  demand  for  imported  goods  would  be treated  as  a function  of the
level of investment  demand and the relative  price of  imported  and
domestically  produced capital goods  (to the extent that these are
competing  products).- 14  -
and  cost  of capital  variables)  and  to some  of the  factors  that  this
approach  cannot  capture  (notably  in the  areas  of risks  and  regulations).
2.15  To provide  the  context  for  the  required  role  for  private  sector
investment  in future  growth,  we undertook  an indicative  analysis  of
investment  requirements  up to the  mid-1990s,  based  on  plausible  targets  for
growth  in  output  ind  estimated  investment  requirements  for  replacement  and
new investment.  It is limited  to the  key  mining  and  manufacturing  sectors
and,  for  simplicity,  a constant  degree  of  capital  efficiency  is  assumed.
As Table  2.2  shows,  if  the  mining  and  manufacturing  sectors  are  to grow  by
2.9  percent  per  annum  and  4.6  percent  per annum  through  the  mid-1990s  2/
invc.;tment  levels  in the  combined  sectors  have to  rise  to 74  percent  above
the  1981  peak  and  to  over 200  percent  above  the  1984  level  (that  was
probably  above  the  1987  level  for  these  sectors). While  the  assumptions
are subject  to a range  of errors,  and  some  reductions  in investment
requirements  would  occur  with  productivity  increases,  there  is clearly  a
need f.r  a major  rise  in  private  investment.
Table  2.2  Prolected  Investment  Reauirements  for  the
Mfnina  and  Manufacturina  Sectors  in  1995
Assurotions  Reults
Growth  in  Capitat  Increase  in real  investmnt
output  Depreciation  output  by  1995  relative  to
1987 95  rate  ratio  i'  1981  1984
(X  p.a.)  (X}  C..  X
Mining  2.9  5.0  4.4  40  246
Manufacturing  4.6  5.0  2.4  100  191
Total  n.a  n.a.  n.a.  74  206
p/  Derived  from  a  historical  aggregate  capitaL  stock  series  calculated  for  the  1987 CEN
distributed  across  sectors  according  to total  investment  levels.
Source:  World  Bank  staff  projections.
2.16  The result  is  of importance  for  the  private  sector  because  of its
predominance  in these  sectors. It  was suggested  above  that  there  is
considerable  uncertainty  over  the  future  growth  in  private  investment.  A
mechanistic  use  of the  estimation  results  for  forecasting  could  predict  a
quite  rapid  recovery  in investment  following  an output  recovery,  especially
if this  were also  associated  with a  decline  in the  relative  price  of
capital  goods. But there  are  a number  of  reasons  for  not  being  optimistic
about  the  responsiveness  of  private  investment,  especially  since  the  only
significant  rise  in  private  investment  in the  post-independence  period
quickly  petered  out in  response  to  worsened  macroeconomic  conditions.  The
1Q/ These  happen  to  be the  growth  rates  from  the  latest  projection  we have
done in an accounting  (RHSM-type)  model--they  are  consistent  with the
maintenance  of external  balance.- 15  -
subsequent  depression  in  investment  has  been deep  and  there  has  been  very
little  new  foreign  investment  inflows  by either  new  or established  foreign
investors. If the  endogenous  private  sector  response  is  weak,  this  implies
that  one  of two  courses  will  be necessary  if capital  it  not  to constitute  a
brake  on future  growth  in these  sectors. Either  othe.  measures  will  have
to  be implemented  to  change  the  relationship  between  private  investment  and
macroeconomic  conditions  or the  public  sector  will  have  to play  a  much
larger  role  in investment  in these  sectors. The latter  course  brings  risks
of less  efficient  resource  use,  a further  worsening  in the  public  sector's
resource  position  and  potential  negative  influence  on private  sector
investment.  This  warrants  further  analysis,  but is  not  the  focus  of
attention  of this  paper. The  main interest  here lies  in  examining
potential  areas  for  getting  private  investment  going,  based  on an
assessment  of the  current  situation. The  following  sections  turn  to  an
account  of the  financial,  incentive  and  regulatory  framework  for  domestic
and foreign  corporate  investment.- 16  -
3.  THE  STRUCTURE  OF ZIMBABWEAN  CORPORATE  FINANCE
3.1  This  chapter  turns  to the  first  specific  area  of potential
importance  in  determining  current  and  future  investment  levels--the  pattern
of corporate  finance. This  is of importance  to an  understanding  of the
extent  to  which  financing  constraints  are important  influences  on
investment  behavior,  of the  relations  between  the  corporate  sector  and the
financial  system,  and  the  implications  for  future  financial  sector
development  and  policy. It starts  with  an analysis  of the  sources  and  uses
of funds,  then  discusses  the  reasons  for  the  high  degree  of self-financing
and  concludes  with  projections  of the  future  demand  for  debt.
Sources  and  Uses  of Funds
3.2  A high degree  of self-financing  is  a central  feature  of corporate
finance  in Zimbabwe. Corporations  generally  rely  on internal  sources  of
funds,  consisting  of retained  earnings  and  capital  consumption  allowances,
for  the  bulk of their  financing  requirements.  The  composition  of sources
of  funds  is shown  for  listed  companies  in  Table  3.1.  1Q/  Between  1980  and
1987  company  retained  earnings  and  depreciation  allowances  accounted  for  60
percent  of the  total  sources  of funds. Issuance  of  new shares  has
accounted  for  eight  percent  of total  sources  for  the  period  as a whole,  but
its  contribution  has  been  erratic,  often  reflecting  the  funding  behavior  of
only  one  large  company. Most  notable  has  been  the  very low  contribution  of
debt  capital. Public  issuance  of corporate  bonds  has  been  virtually
non-existent  (though  reportedly  long-term  borrowings  do  occur  on a private
placement  basis),  and  recourse  to  bank  borrowing  has amounted  to  only 13
percent  of total  companies'  needs  for  funds. The  remaining  16  percent  of
sources  of funds  has  been  met through  trade  credits.
Q/  This is derived from flow of funds  and balance sheet  data for the
listed  companies  on the Zimbabwe  Stock  Exchange. For the  non-listed
companies,  there  exists  no comparable  information. These companies
are not legally  obligated  to publish  income-expenditure  and balance
sheet  data.  Indirect  evidence,  based  on field  interviews  and  the  low
ratio of  total credit to  investment  in  Zimbabwe, suggests that
self-financing  is  high  in these  companies  as  well.- 17  -
Table  3.1  Financint  Sources  of  Non-Financial  CQrnorations
1980-1282
(percentage  of total  sources  of funds)
Average
198n-1987 1980  1981 1982 1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Gross  Internal  59.2  54.0 40.1 40.9  50.9  87.5  82.6  53.6 74.1
Funds
Retained  Earnings 37.0  37.8  28.2 20.0  10.9 35.4  54.3  37.6 53.9
Depreciation  22.2  16.2  12.0 20.9 40.1  52.1  28.3 16.1  20.2
New  Stock  Issues  8.3  26.6 10.8  0.6  9.4  6.4  0.5  1.2  14.7
Medium/Long  Term
Loans  3.2  -1.0  14.0  32.4  4.4  -3.6  -13.7  -0.2  -7.2
Short  Term  Loans  9.6  2.2  13.4  8.3  18.7  -28.9  6.6  27.3  4.7
Trade  Credits  17.5  16.5  17.5 17.1  12.5  37.0 19.2  16.5  13.9
Other  Sources  2.1  1.7  4.1  0.7  4.1  1.7  4.8  1.6  -0.2
Source: All 48 corporations  listed  in the  Zimbabwe  Stock  Exchange  (ZSE).
3.3  Table  3.2  then  provides  a  breakdown  of the  uses  of funds  for
listed  companies  over the  1980-1987  period. These  companies  have,  in the
aggregate,  used over  half  of their  resources  on investment  in fixed  assets.
Roughly  one-quarter  has  been  used  to finance  debtor  accounts  or to finance
long-term  financial  investment.  This ratio  of fixed  assets  is  much larger
than  in  other  developing  countries  and  is  strikingly  close  to  the  pattern
observed  in industrialized  countries,  particularly  the  U.S. and  the  U.K.
(See  Table  3.4).  Despite  the  large  share  of fixed  assets  in  the  uses of
funds,  the  degree  of self-financing  is  even  more  striking  in  relation  to
fixed  investment.  As Table  3.3  and  Figure  3.1  show,  internal  sources  of
funds  were  equivalent  to  over  100  percent  of fixed  investment  in the  1980s
for  both  local  and  foreign  controlled  companies. This suggests  that,  as
far  as fixed  investment  has  been  concerned,  the  listed  companies  would  have
been  more  than  able  to  meet their  own  financing  needs,  with  no dependence
on financial  intermediaries.  Firm  interviews  confirm  that  external  finance
is little  used  for  fixed  investment  and  predominantly  for  the  companies'
operating  requirements,  including  funds  for  working  capital  to  pay for
stocks  and  work in  progress,  financing  trade  debtors  and  for  holding  cash
and  other  liquid  assets.- 18  -
Table  3.2.  Uses  of Funds  of Non-Financial  Corporations
1280-1987
(percentage  of total  uses  of funds)
Average
1980-1987 1980  1981 1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 1987
Capital  Formation  77.4  74.3  78.7 91.6  88.7  52.6  74.9  72.4 78.8
Fixed  Investment  53.1  46.1  55.3 62.8  79.4  56.2 48.7  39.4 53.2
Inventories  24.4  28.3  23.4  28.8  9.3  -3.6 26.2  33.0 25.6
Cash  0.8  -1.9  0.1  -4.2  -4.8  13.5  5.0  2.2  -0.1
Debtor  18.0  20.1  16.7  10.9  13.0  31.1  12.5  23.1  18.8
Long  Term  Loans
and  Investments  0.5  1.0  1.6  0.6  -0.4  1.3  1.0  -0.3  -0.1
Other  Uses  3.3  6.4  3.0  1.1  3.5  1.4  6.5  2.6  2.5
Source: All 48 corporations  listed  in the  ZSE.
Table  3.3  Self-Financine  over  Fixed  Investment  Ratios
Local  and  Foreign  held  CQmaniLes
(percentage  per  annum)
Local  Comoanies  Foreign  Comqanie§
Internal  Internal  Funds  and  Internal  Internal  Funds  and
Year  Funds  New Stock  Isaues  Funds  New Stock  Issues
1980  90.1  118.5  133.9  206.2
1981  76.4  121.3  71.6  82.8
1982  69.8  70.6  63.2  64.3
1983  41.7  70.0  78.6  79.7
1984  94.7  126.4  183.5  185.5
1985  89.5  92.0  225.6  225.4
1986  124.9  133.5  141.5  141.8
1987  101.4  110.1  165.9  206.8
Source:  All  48 corporations  listed  in  the  ZSE.Table  3.4  Composition  of Corporate  Business-Assets  in_SelectedcCountries.-1983
(percentage  of total  assets)
Columbia  11  Germany  21 India  3/  Japan  2/  Korea  41  Turkey  51  U.K.  21 USA.  21  Zimbabwe  6/
1. Fixed  Assets  a/  32.24  32.38  41.75  27.19  39.62  34.90  41.76  61.00  55.85
2. Inventories  bl  15.38  21.18  29.97  14.01  17.72  19.80  20.39  14.62  23.15
3.  Accounts
Receivable  c/  26.02  29.99  f/  20.46  36.81  16.57  24.16  23.37  13.58  14.28
4. Liquid  Assets  d/  6.48  4.01  6.31  13.32  10.93  5.72  7.13  5.59  2.49
5.  Other  Assets  e/  19.88  12.44  1.51  8.67  15.16  15.42  7.35  5.21  4.61
6. Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 100.00 100.00  100.00
a/  Net  of  accumulated  depreciation.
b/  Work in  progress  and  raw  materials.
c/  Trade  and  other  account  receivable.
d/  Cash,  bank  deposits  and  marketable  securities.
el  Includes  investments  and  other  deposits.
fl  Includes  short  term  bills  and  bonds.
Source:  1/  Superintendencia  de  Sociedades.  Boletin  Estadistico  No.  6,  1983.
2/  OECD  Financial  Statistics  Part  3. 1986.
Non  Financial  Corporations  in  Germany,  Japan  (total  sample),  U.K.  (large  companies  in  all
industries)  and  U.S.A.
3/  Reserve  Bank  of India  Bulletin,  1986.
4/  Bank  of Korea,  Financial  Statement  Analysis,  1983.
5/  Industrial  Development  Bank.  1987. Consolidated  balance  sheets  of 185  companies.
6/  Based  on the  48  listed  Companies  in  the  Zimbabwe  Stock  Exchange.  1988.Figure  3.1
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3.4  The similarity  on the  asset  side  of corporate  balance  sheets
between  Zimbabwean  and  British  companies  extends  also  to the  liability
side.  It is  a well  known  feature  of British  corporate  finance  that
companies  rely  heavily  on internal  sources  of funds. Gross  internal  funds
accoutnted  over  the  period  1970-1985  for  about  70  percent  of total  sources
of funds.  ]J/  Furthermore,  in terms  of financing  of fixed  investment,  the
non-financial  corporate  sector  has  been  completely  self-financed.  In the
words  of one  expert,  win  terms  of financing  of physical  investment,  the
non-financial  corporate  sector  could  have  been fLoated  off  separately  from
the  financial  corporate  sector,  with  no net  consequence  for  corporate
investment."  12/  Such  a degree  of similarity  in the  pattern  of corporate
financing  between  Zimbabwe  and  the  United  Kingdom  is  not surprising.  Apart
from  the  strong  historical  linkages  and influences,  a majority  of
foreign-controlled  companies  are  subsidiaries  of  British-based
multinationals  (or  South  African  companies  with British  traditions).
The  Structure  of the  Financial  System
3.5  A  high degree  of self-finance  might  be expected  to  be associated
with  a relatively  weakly  developed  financial  system,  especially  at the  long
end  of the  market. The  opposite  is true. Zimbabwe  has an  unusually  deep
financial  sector  in terms  of the  range  of financial  institutions  and,  in
particular,  a  high  proportion  of long-term  assets  and  liabilities.  The
British  influence  is again  strong:  the  commercial  banking  sector  is
dominated  by the  presence  of branches  or subsidiaries  of British  banks.
There  are  also important  similarities  in the  structure  of financial
intermediaries  and  capital  markets. In  both  countries,  institutional
investors,  notably  insurance  companies,  are  dominant  players  in  financial
intermediation.  Also,  in  both  countries,  bond  markets  are  characterized  by
the  exclusive  role  of the  public  sector  and  the  conspicuous  absence  of the
cotporate  sector.
3.6  These  ties  and  similarities  cannot,  of  course,  be stretched  too
far. There  are important  differences  in Zimbabwean  industrial  structure,
degree  of financial  intermediation,  size  and  role  of  equity  markets,  to
mention  only  a few. Yet, this  degree  of similarity  observed  in  the
financial  structure  and  in the  pattern  of  corporate  finance  serves  to
provide  a useful  point  of reference  and  to  underline  the  relative
sophistication  of the  financial  intermediary  system  in  Zimbabwe. Compared
to  many  developing  countries,  Zimbabwe  has a  highly  sophisticated  financial
intermediary  system  with  a  broadly  based  institutional  structure  spanning
over  banks,  finance  companies,  pension  funds  and  insurance  companies. In
terms  of the  overall  degree  of intermediation,  the  country's  financial
system  is  comparable  with  the  average  performance  of  middle-income
IJ/  See C. Mayer, 'New  Issues  in Corporate  Finance,"  European  Economic
Review,  1988,  pp.  1167-1189.
12/  ibid,  p. 1172.Figure  3.2
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developing  countries,  but its  capacity  to supply  long-term  capital,  as
exemplified  by the  important  role  of institutional  investors  and  the  depth
of the  country's  capital  market,  places  Zimbabwe  ahead  of  many countries,
including  Chile,  Korea,  India,  Singapore,  and  Greece  II/ (see  Figure  3.2).
3.7  What is this  aophisticated  financial  system  doing  if it is  not
lending  much long-term  canital  to the  corporate  sector? A dominant
function,  especially  since  the  mid-1980s,  is  doing  a very  effective  job  of
intermediating  between  the  private  and  public  sectors. Private  corporate
and  household  savings  are  captured  in a range  of financial  assets,
including  commercial  bank deposits,  post  office  savings  accounts  and
pensions  and  life  insurance.  Much of this  is  onlent  to the  public  sector,
most  notably  in the  form  of short-term  loans  (that  are  automatically  rolled
over)  to the  Agricuiltural  Marketing  Authority  and  medium  to long-term
public  bonds.  This  is facilitated  by a range  of required  assets
requirements  that  effectively  channel  the  resources  into  these  public
liabilities.  It should  be emphasized,  however,  that  there  is  little
evidence  of direct  crowding  out  of the  private  business  sector,  owing  to
its  weak  demand  for  credit  in this  period. In  addition  the  financial
system  already  plays  a  major  role in  three  important  areas  for  the  private
sector. First,  it  provides  a  range  of services  related  to short-run
finance  of the  corporate  sector:  indeed,  the  unusually  low  proportion  of
the  assets  of corporations  in  debtor  accounts  is  probably  a  direct
reflection  of the  efficiency  of the  banking  sector. Second,  there  has  been
continued  (and  worrying)  growth  in credit  to the  private  farming  sector,
with commercial  farmers  having  the  dominant  share  in indebtedness.  While
other  parts  of the  private  sector  were  reluctant  to  borrow  and  able  to
avoid  this,  farmers,  appeared  to  have  had  no choice. Third,  there  has  been
both growth  and  diversification  in  private  housing  finance,  with lending  by
the  building  societies  for  low-cost  housing  of  rising  significance.
Exnlaining  the  Pattern  of Finance
3.8  What  causes  corporations  in  Zimbabwe  to  depend  to such  a large
extent  on internally  generated  source  of funds  to finance  their  fixed
capital  formation  and  so little  on debt  financing? To the  extent  that  the
cost  of debt  financing  falls  below  the  rate  of return  on invested  capital,
there  would  appear  to  be good  reason  for  companies  to increase  leverage.
This  has  been the  case in  Zimbabwe  since  1980,  at least,  if  the  cost  of
debt financing  is  narrowly  defined  to  refer  only  to interest  charges.
Return  on capital  employed  (net  of depreciation)  has  averaged  15.8  percent
over 1980-1987,  as compared  to interest  rates  for  the  corporate  sector
slightly  above  the  minimum  lending  rate  of 13  percent  (compared  with an
average  of 10.3  percent  on  bank certificates  of deposit  in the  1980s,  and
13  percent  on government  25-year  bonds). Add to this  the  tax  deductibility
of interest  payments  and  the  effective  cost  of debt  finance  drops  to around
j/  The total  assets  of insurance  companies  in Zimbabwe  in  relation  to GNP
was in 1985  21.5%  compared  to a corresponding  figure  of 9.1%  in  Korea,
6.9%  in  Malaysia,  and  5.17%  in  Chile.- 24 *--
seven  percent  creating  a large  positive  differential  between  company
profitability  and  the  interest  rate.
3.9  The  preference  for  internal  funding  in  the  face  of the  apparent
economic  advantages  of debt  finance  is  not  unusual,  but is a  well-
established  feature  of developed  corporate  E actors  world-wide. Given  their
needs  for  funds,  corporations  are  generally  known  to resort  first  to
internally  generated  sources  of finance,  then  to  debt,  and  lastly  to
issuance  of new  stocks. This financing  order,  which is  referred  to in the
literature  as the  'pecking  order,"  has  an economic  and  practical  rationale;
it reflects  both the  comparative  advantage  of  availability  and  lack  of any
associated  direct  cost  that  internal  finance  offers,  and  also  a general
reluctance  on the  part  of  management  to go  outside  for  funds,  with the
associate  reduction  of control.  lA!
3.10  The  extent  to  which  internal  finance  predominates  then  depends,
of course,  on the  availability  of internal  finance  and the  level  of demand
for  funds  for  both fixed  assets  and  alternative  uses.  Here  the  Zimbabwean
corporate  sector  is  distinctive.  On the  availabilities  side  there  are  two
factors. The sector  is  both reasonably  profitable,  as we'll  see  in the
next  chapter,  and  it  enjoys  generous  depreciation  allowances. These  tax
shields,  earmarked  under  prevailing  tax  codes  to compensate  for  the  portion
of fixed  assets  which  are  used  up during  the  process  of production,
constitute  important  and  often  stable  and  predictable  sources  of internal
funds  in  many countries. The  higher  these  allowances,  the  lower  the
incentive  to draw  on the  tax  benefits  of debt  financing.  I2/  Zimbabwean
firms  can  enjoy  the  full  expensing  provision  permitted  under  the  Special
Initial  Allowance  (SIA),  which  has  been in  effect  since  April  1977. For  a
large  set  of assets,  including  plant  and  machinery,  vehicles,  and  the
industrial  buildings  constructed  by the  company,  the  allowances  permit  full
deduction  of the  cost  of assets  in the  year  of  purchase.  1§/
3.11  There  are  also  low  requirements  for  finance  because  of demand
factors. We saw  that  the  Zimbabwean  corporate  sector  has  relatively  low
requirements  for  its  operating  needs--probably  a reflection  of the
efficiency  of this  part  of the  financial  system. On top  of this  is  the
Jg/ This  preference  of  corporations  to  resort  to  internal  sources  of  finance
was first  elaborated  and empirically  documented  in the  context  of the
United  States  economy  by Gordon  Donaldson  (1961).  Recent  research  by S.
Myers  (1984) and  Majluf (1984) have provided strong theoretical
rationale  for  this  hypothesis.
1/  For  a  theoretical  discussion  of  the  substitution  between  non-debt  related
tax shields  with debt related  tax shields  see De Angelo  and Masulis
(1980),  and for  empirical  evidence,  see,  Titman  and  Wessels  (1988).
1§/ See Chelliah  et al (1986)  Report  of the Commission  of Inquiry into
Taxation.- 25  -
fundamental  factor  in  the  mid-1980s  of the  depressed  state  of fixed
investment  demand. With this  state  of  demand  for  fixed  investment,
companies  have  had  no reason  to  borrow,  irrespective  of the  existing  strong
incentives  in favor  of debt.  In  other  words,  the  answer  to the  above
question--why  have companies  relied  so  much  on internal  resources?--lies  in
the  combination  of a preferred  "pecking  order'  in  sources  of finance  and  a
lack  of growth  on the  demand  side. To see  the  quantitative  logic  of this
argument,  it is  only  necessary  to  understand  the  dynamics  of asset
accumulation  of a purely  self-financing  firm,  which  in the  tax  environment
of Zimbabwean  economy,  is  determined  by one  basic  parameter:  the  rate  of
the  firm's  operating  profits. If it  is considered  that  operating  profits,
before  taxes  and  interest  in  the  corporate  sector  of the  Zimbabwean  economy
averaged  approximately  15.8  percent  of total  capital  employed  11/  over  the
1980-1987  period,  and  corporate  income  taxes  averaged  roughly  27  percent  of
operating  income,  it  follows  directly  that  t'.e  highest  rate  of  growth  in
total  capital  that  could  have  been  achieved  under  a self-financing  strategy
(i.e.  if firms  paid  no dividends  or interest)  would  have  been about  11.5
percent  per  year.  .II This  is equal  to almost  80  percent  of the  actual
rate  of growth  achieved  during  that  period.
The  Future  Demand  for  Debt  Finance
3.12  What are  the  implications  for  the  future? To  assess  the
interaction  between  growth  and  demand  for  debt  capital,  it is  necessary  to
expand  the  scope  of the  analysis  to incorporate  the  influence  of firms'
dividend  policy  and  various  provisions  regarding  interest  payments  and
capital  consumption  allowances.  This is  illustrated  in  Table  3.5,  which
shows  the  projected  increase  in demand  for  loans  for  both local  and
foreign-controlled  companies,  under  three  alternative  scenarios  of fixed
investment  expansion:  15  percent,  20  percent,  and  25  percent  per  year.
Under  the  lowest  case  scenario,  the  local  companies'  aggregate  debt  to
capital  ratio  increases  from  33  percent  in  1987  to 70  percent  in  1992.  For
foreign-controlled  companies,  the  rise  in  aggregate  leverage  ratio  iv'  more
modest,  from  17  percent  in  1987  to 32  percent  in 1992. In the  second
scenario,  when investment  is  assumed  to  grow  at an annual  rate  of 20
percent,  corporate  debt  increases,  by 1992,  to reach  levels  of 73  percent
and  36  percent  for  local  and  foreign  companies  respectively.  With fixed
investment  growing  at an  annual  rate  of 25  percent,  the  corresponding  rise
in  leverage  ratios  is 76  percent  and  40 percent.
11/ Capital  is  defined  as fixed  assets  plus inventories.
J1/  The  average  27  percent  measures  the  effective  corporate  income  tax  rate.
This is (as  will  be explained  below)  much lower  than  the  52  percent  average
statutory  tax  rate.-26  -
Table  3.5  Prolected  Financing  Reguirements  for  Various
Investment  Expansion  Scenarios.  198 7- 1 992  a/
Average
1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
1. Investment  Growth  Rate:  15%
A. Increase  in  Company
Debt  b/ (Percentages)
al.  Foreign  (19.6)  14.1  17.9  20.6  22.2  23.0
a2.  Local  7.8  31.5  28.7  26.6  24.9  23.5
a3.  Total  (8.8)  22.3  23.4  23.8  23.7  23.3
B. Leverage  Ratio  c/
bl.  Foreign  0.17  0.19  0.21  0.24  0.28  0.32
b2.  Local  0.33  0.41  0.48  0.55  0.63  G.70
b3. Total  0.22  0.26  0.30  0.35  0.40  0.46
2. Investment  Growth  Rate:  20%
A. Increase  in  Company
Debt  b/ (Percentages)
al.  Foreign  (19.6)  16.1  21.6  25.4  27.5  28.4
a2.  Local  7.8  33.3  31.5  29.9  28.5  27.3
a3.  Total  (8.8)  24.2  26.6  27.8  28.1  27.9
B. Leverage  Ratio  c/
bl. Foreign  0.17  0.19  0.22  0.26  0.31  0.36
b2. Local  0.33  0.41  0.49  0.57  0.65  0.73
b3. Total  0.22  0.22  0.31  0.37  0.43  0.49
3.  Investment  Growth  Rate:  25%
A. Increase  in  Company
Debt  b/ (Percentages)
al.  Foreign  (19.6)  18.1  25.4  30.2  32.8  33.7
a2.  Local  7.8  35.1  34.4  33.4  32.3  31.3
a3.  Total  (8.8)  26.1  29.9  31.9  32.5  32.4
B. Leverage  Ratio  c/
bl. Foreign  0.17  0.19  0.23  0.28  0.33  0.40
b2. Local  0.33  0.41  0.50  0.59  0.68  0.76
b3. Total  0.22  0.26'  0.32  0.38  0.46  0.53
a/  Model  sim-alation,  using  following  parameter  values:
(i)  dividend  payout  ratio:  25%  foreign  companies  an.
50%  local  companies.
(ii) effective  corporate  income  tax  rate  of 51.75%.
(iii) constant  interest  rate  of 14.14%  for  local  companies  and
12.33%  for  foreign  companies.
/  Short  term  and  long  term  debt.
gJ Ratio  of total  outstanding  debt  to total  capital  employed.- 27  -
3.13  Even  under  the  higher  growth  scenario,  these  ratios  are  quite
reasonable  by the  standards  of other  developing  countries,  and  are
comparable  to the  observed  ratios  in  Colombia  and  Korea,  for  example.
However  they  have important  implications  in three  areas.
(i)  The  pattern  of credit  growth. If the  corporate  sector  is  to
have a  much larger  role  in credit  demand  this  will  have  major  implications
for  monetary  management  and  the  affordable  level  of domestic  finance  of the
fiscal  deficit  in  order  to avoid  major  pressures  on the  financial  system
(and  on the  overall  equilibrium  of the  economy).
(ii)  The  development  of the  capital  market. As noted  above,  the
capital  market  is largely  oriented  toward  government  bond finance. This  is
fine  as long  as there  is  little  demand  for  investment  finance  from  the
corporate  sector,  but if  there  is to  be an institutional  shift  toward
increased  use of the  financial  system,  much  greater  reliance  on the  capital
market  would  be desirable.  Apart  from  allowing  a greater  quantitative
allocation  of resources  to  the  corporate  sector  (i.e.  less  channelling  of
long-term  money  into  government  stock)  there  is a need  to  both encourage
greater  use  of the  stock  exchange  and  a corporate  debenture  market.
(iii)  Regulations  of  borrowing. For  most  foreign  companies,
these  levels  of debt  would  exceed  current  limits  on  domestic  borrowing  and
so would  only  be consistent  with current  regulations  if the  companies
concerned  significantly  increased  foreign  borrowing  for  the  foreign
exchange  content  of investment.
These  questions  are  taken  up in  the  policy  conclusions., 28  -
4.  RATES OF RETURN  AND THE COST OF CAPITAL
4.1  If  macroeconomic  conditions  provide  the  basis  for  an  underlying
demand  for  replacement  and  expansion  in  capital  then  the  decision  to invest
will  depend  on the  relationship  between  the  rate  of return  and  the  cost  of
capital. Both  of these  are  influenced  by the  pattern  of specific
incentives  for  investment  and  other  factors  in  the  economic  environment,  of
which  factors  affecting  perceived  risks  are  of  particular  importance  for
tho  corporate  sector. In the  end,  private  investors  will  compare  the
expected  rate  of return  on a  potential  project  with the  marginal  cost  of
capital. It  was  not  the  objective  of this  report  to look  into  possible
rates  of return  on new  projects--that  is the  job  of the  private  sector.
The  focus  is rather  on two  questions:  have  historical  rates  of return
between  unusually  low  in  the  private  sector?  and  what are  the  principal
influences  on the  cost  of capital,  and  how  are  these  affected  by policies?
In this  report  we used  historical  evidence  on the  rate  of return  on capital
and  the  various  factors  influencing  the  cost  of capital  (of  whiLh  the
interest  rate  is only  one  component)  to examine  these  questions.
4.2  Incentives  for  investment.  We start  with an illustration  using  a
simplified  example  to  capture  some  of the  key factors  affecting  the
investment  decision,  including  specific  incentives.  Investment  incentives
refer  to the  inducements  offered  by governments  through  various  tax
shields,  accelerated  depreciation  schemes,  investment  tax  credits  and
risk-sharing  arrangements  aimed  at encouraging  companies  to  undertake
projects  that  they  otherwise  would  not  have  undertaken. Investment
incentives  can  be viewed  as catalysts  serving  to increase  the  supply  of
projects  that  are  economically  viable  or that  meet  the  corporations'
investment  criteria;  12/ such  supply  can  be enhanced  by lowering  the  hurdle
rate  that  projects  must  pass  in order  to  be considered  economically  viable.
To illustrate  this  point,  it is  useful  to refer  to a numerical  example.
Consider  a company  that  contemplates  investing  in  a project  costing  $1,000
and  operates  under  the  conditions  defined  by the  following  parameters:
(1)  Required  real  rate  of return  on shareholder's  equity - 8%
(2)  Corporate  income  tax  rate  - 50%
(3)  Nominal  rate  of interest  - 14%
(4)  Rate of inflation  - 10%
(5)  Rate  of economic  depreciation  - 5%
]IV The  implicit  assumption  here  is  that  firms  do  have  the  desire  to  invest,
but  their  action  is  constrained  by lack  of  economically  viable  projects.
The  critical role of  investment  incentives  is  then to transform
non-viable projects into viable projects by  favorably affecting
investors'  expectations  of retutn  on projects  relative  to the  cost  of
financing  projects.- 29  -
4.3  Table  4.1 then  presents  the  results  of some  alternative
simulations. Based  on these  parameters,  it  can  be calculated  that  if  the
company  is  fully  self-financed,  and if  there  is  no tax  depreciation
deduction,  the  project  must  generate  a stream  of  pre-tax  returns  of $260
(or  26  per  cent),  in  order  to  break  even  and  provide  the  required  return  to
shareholders.  With standard  tax  deductibility  of depreciation  (straight-
line  with  an allowable  asset  life  of ten  years),  the  required  pre-tax  rate
of return  drops  to the  equivalent  of 16 percent. This is  roughly
equivalent  to the  impact  of a  reduction  in corporate  income  tax  rate  from
50  percent  to 25  percent,  that  would  lower  the  required  return  on the
project  to $173  or 17 percent. Alternatively,  if the  company  is  assumed  to
finance  half of its  initial  project  cost through  debt  capital,  and  if
interest  payments  are  fully  tax  deductible,  the  required  return  on project
declines  to $150  or 15  percent.
Table  4.1  Simulating  the  ImDact  of Alternative  Investment
Incentives  on the  Reguired  Return  on a Project
Case I: Self-financing,  Case  IV:  50%  debt  financing
no tax  deductible  depreciation  and  no tax  deductibility  of
Return  to  Shareholders  80  deDreciation  allowances
Economic  Depreciation  50  Return  to  Shareholders:  40
Corporate  Income  Tax  :  130  Economic  Depreciation  :  50
Total  Required  Return  260  Interest  Payments  :  70
Debt Tax Shield  :  -35
Case  II:  Self-financing,  with  Increase  in  Real  Value
Deoreciation  Tax  allowances  A/  of Equity  Due  to
Return  to Shareholders  :  80  Inflation  - Induced
Economic  Depreciation  :  50  Depreciation  of Debt  :  -50
Tax-Depreciation  allowance:  -50  'orporate  Income  Tax  :  75
Corporate  Income  Tax  :  80  Total  Required  Return  150
Total  Required  Return  :  160
Case  III  Decline  in  corporate
income  tax  to 25%
Return  to Shareholders  :  80
Economic  Depreciation  :  50
Corporate  Income  Tax  :  43
Total  . 173
a/  Based  on straight  line  depreciation  scheme  with ten  years  allowable
asset  lifetime.
4.4  Both  the  full  calculations  and  Zimbabwe's  systems  of tax  shields
are  more  complex  than  this. Zimbabwe  currently  has full  expensing  of
investment  for  many fixed  asset  categories--that  is  more generous  than  the
straight-line  depreciation  illustrated  here--as  well as tax  deductibility
of interest  (though  the  importance  of the  latter  for  fixed  investment  is
relatively  low  because  of the  limited  use of  debt  finance). Together  these
constitute  a more  generous  package  than  the  tax  incentives  in the- 30  -
simulations.  This cannot  be captured  in  such  a simple  model,  but  two
points  are  clear:  first,  tax  shields  significantly  reduce  the  required  rate
of return  on a  project,  thereby  increasing  the  number  of projects  than  can
meet  a firm's  hurdle  rate;  and  second,  Zimbabwe's  tax  allowances  are
generous,  and  are  equivalent  to  a substantially  lower  average  corporate
income  tax  rate  in the  absence  of allowances.
4.5  In a  broader  context,  the  importance  of investment  incentives  can
be appreciated  by the  way they  affect  the  return  on investment  relative  to
the cost of capital.  The return on one dollar of capital  invested in a
particular  project  relative  to  the  cost  of funding  that  dollar  of capital
is  what  matters  in determining  the  desirability  of investing  in that
project. The  ratio  between  the  return  on investment  and  the  cost  of
capital  is  of particular  significance  in the  context  of companies'  fixed
investment  decisions  both  at the  individual  firm  and  at the  aggregate
corporate  sector  level. Changes  in  this  ratio  signal  changes  in incentives
to invest  in  fixed  assets.  2Q/
4.6  This  then  suggests  a useful  approach  to evaluating  Investment
incentives.  There  a  e two  aspects  to this  approach: (i)  the  determination
of the  return  on corporate  capital  assets  and  its  distribution  among  the
three  major  claim  holders,  i.e.,  the  shareholders,  the  Government  and the
creditors;  and (ii)  the  determination  of the  cost  of capital  and its
sensitivity  to changes  in taxes,  interest  rate,  the  real  price  of  capital
and investors'  required  rate  of return. In  what  follows,  we will  discuss
the  relevance  of each  and  establish  their  quantitative  dimensions  for  the
corporate  sector  in Zimbabwe.
Profitability  and  the  Rate  of Return  on Cagital
4.7  The relevant  concept  of  profitability,  from  the  viewpoint  of
potential  investors,  is the  future  expected  after-tax  rate  of return  on
in-lvestment.  This  is  not  directly  observable.  What is possible,
instead  211 is  to rely  on historical  trends  to infer  such  estimates  of
return  on corporate  investment.  Two  possible  sources  are  available:
2_0 To elaborate  further  on the  significance  of this  ratio,  it  is  useful  to
explore  its  relation  with the  Tobin  q-ratio. Define  q  - MV/K  where  NV
and  K are  respectively  the  market  and  replacement  value  of  capital,  c  -
Y/MV  and  r  - Y/K  as the  cost  of  capital  and  return  on capital  where  Y  -
operating  profit. From  these  equations,  it follows  that  q - r/c.  For
further  detail  and  application  in the  context  of developing  countries,
see  Dailami  (1986).
j/  Relevant to this expectation  is not only the profitability  of the
underlying  capital  base, but also taxes  and companies'  dividend  and
financial  policy. For  foreign  investors,  there  are  also  the  additional
factors  of remittability  of dividend  and  profit  proceeds  and exchange
rate fluctuations.  In the analysis in this paper we  deal with
uncertainty  over  remittability  in  the  cost  of equity.- 31  -
securities  markets  and  company  accounts.  We used  the  latter  in this
report,  but first  discuss  the  issues  associated  with  the  stock  exchange.
4.8  The  Zimbabwe  Stock  Exchange. There  is  considerable  doubt  on the
reliability  of securities  market  generated  estimates  of the  return  on
capital. This  doubt  exists  even  when  markets  are  highly  developed,  broadly
based  and  considered  to  be efficient,  as for  instance  in  the  case  of the
U.S.  21/ These  doubts  naturally  multiply  when  market  imperfections  are
serious  and  when  major  disparities  persist  between  market  valuation  and  the
book  value  of assets. In Zimbabwe,  the  equity  market  has
characteristically  underestimated  coiporations'  asset  values  in  relation  to
book  values.  This  undervaluation  has,  since  1981,  averaged  more  than
one-half  of the  book  value  of corporate  equity,  and is  conceivably  much
higher  if assets  were  valued  at their  replacement  costs. In addition
market  fluctuations  have  been  considerable,  leading  to  wide  variations,
even in  yearly  observations  (see  Figure  4.1). Based  on the  performance  of
industrial  share  prices,  the  market  registered  an  annual  growth  rate  of 9.2
percent  over  the  1980-1987  period,  which  fares  poorly  given  the
corresponding  rate  of inflation  of 12.2  percent  over the  same  period  of
time,  though  growth  since  1984  has  clearly  exceeded  inflation.
4.9  There  are two  possible  accounts  of the  apparent  undervaluation  of
the  equity  market. First,  the  undervaluation  could  only  be apparent,  and
the  stock  exchange  could  be doing  a good  job  of assessing  expected  future
returns  on the  capital  of the  companies. This  would  imply  either  that  book
values  grossly  overstate  the  economic  value  of firms'  capital  i.e.  a
substantial  portion  of assets  are  not  worth  much,  or that  there  is a  very
high  risk  premium  attached  to  future  returns,  that  is  reflected  in a
discounted  market  value. Second,  the  market  could  be inefficient,
especially  because  of the  very low  level  of primary  and  secondary  market
turnover. Since  most firms  also  have  a fairly  fixed  group  of shareholders,
the  market  valuation  could  be a  poor guide  to the  value  attached  to them  by
these  shareholders  or  by potential  buyers. The  evidence  suggests  a
combination  of  both factors. On the  one  hand,  there  are  reasons  why
company  values  may  be discounted--this  is  especially  true  for  foreign
companies  interested  in  getting  their  money,  even  at  a major  discount--and
there  also  a range  of reasons  for  there  to  be  high  actual  and  perceived
risks. On the  other  hand,  the  exchange  is  clearly  also  not  performing
fully  efficiently  as an open  market  in  company  shares. There  has  been  a
dearth  in  new  issues  and the  recent  spate  in  rights  issues  has largely  been
due to  special  factors. The  infrastructure  for  an  active  market  Is also
very  weakly  developed. A major  consequence  of these  factors  is  that  the
market  is in  a  vicious  cycle--the  perception  that  it is  a weak,  and  until
recently  a  moribund,  institution,  serves  as a disincentive  to  use it (and
especially  to seek  a listing)  and  this  serves  to  perpetuate  the  low  level
of activity. While  it  was  decided  not  to  use  it for  the  rate  of return
2/  See  Brainard,  Shoven  and  Weiss (1980),  and Co1n  and  Modigliani  (1985)
for  reasons  for  securities  market  failures  for  valuing  corporate  assets
rationally  and  efficiently  in the  U.S.IL
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calculations,  there  are  clearly  important  issues  of  how to  get it  going
again,  since  it  should  lie  at the  core  of capital  market  activity. A push
on the  demand  side--to  get  more  companies  interested  in  using  it--and  on
its  capabilities,  e.g.  through  technical  assistance,  is likely  to  be
necessary.
4.10  Rates  of Return  from  Company  Accounts. The  measurement  of the
return  on corporate  investment  from  company  accounts  is  not free  of
problems  either. There  is  first  the  problem  of  what concepts  of  capital
and  profits  are  to be adopted,  since  there  are  many  ways that  both  capital
and  profits  can  be defined  and  measured. At one  extreme,  capital  can  be
defined  narrowly  to include  plant,  equipment  and inventories  and,  at the
other,  it  can  be defined  broadly  to  include  total  tangible  assets,  as  well
as intangibles,  such  as property  rights,  goodwill  and  special  earning
opportunities.  Similarly,  profits  can  be defined  net  or gross  of
depreciation,  and inclusive  or  exclusive  of  holding  gains  (losses).
Secondly,  company  accounts  record  asset  values  at  historical  cost,  and
these,  in the  case  of Zimbabwe,  fall  considerably  short  of replacement
values;  the  overall  rate  of inflation  (GDP  deflator)  has  averaged  over  the
1980-1987  period,  12.2  percent  per  year;  and,  on top  of that,  capital  goods
prices  have increased  over  the  same  period  on average  by 3.5  percent  per
year.  Furthermore,  uncertainties  about  the  allocation  of foreign  exchange
and  supply  of foreign  capital  goods  are  considerable  in  Zimbabwe,  implying
an important  risk  premium  which  needs  to  be attached  to  the  replacement
value  of capital  assets.
4.11  With these  reservations  in  mind,  Table  4.2  uses  company  balance
sheet  and income  expenditure  data  to  provide  measures  of the  return  on
capital  employed  for  the  two  subgroups  of local  and  foreign  listed
companies  over the  1980-1987  period. Capital  employed  is  defined  as the
sum  of  plant,  equipment,  land,  inventories,  and  net  monetary  assets  (cash
and  net  accounts  receivable).  Profits  are  defined  as operating  incomes  net
of depreciation  and  excluding  holding  gains  (losses). The  estimates  are
inclusive  of  company  taxes  and  thus  are  suitable  measures  of corporate
profitability  and  productivity  of the  underlying  capital  base.  The
estimates  indicate  returns  of 18.0  and  15.1  percent  respectively  for  local
and  foreign  companies. The  higher  return  for  local  companies  seems  to
reflect  the  higher  degree  of debt  financing.  Having  more flexibility  and
access  to domestic  capital  market,  the  local  companies  have  been in  a
relatively  better  position  to optimize  their  financing  mixes  and,
consequently,  their  overall  profitability.  For  the  companies,  as a  whole,
the  return  on  capital  has  averaged  15.8  percent  over the  1980-1987  period
in  nominal,  or 3.6  psrcent  in real  terms.
4.12  Of course,  the  returns  reported  in  Table  4.2  refer  to the
profitability  of total  capital  employed,  which  needs  to  be shared  among  the
three  classes  of claim  holders;  i.e.,  the  Government,  the  creditor  and  the
shareholders.  Table  4.3  shows  the  actual  distribution  of operating  income
for  the  listed  companies  as a  whole  for  the  period  from  1980  to 1987  into
its  three  components: corporate  income  taxes  paid,  net interest,  and  net
equity  income. It  can  be seen  that  the  share  of the  Government  or the
effective  corporate  income  tax  rate  has  averaged  27.8  percent. This is
considerably  lower  than  the  average  statutory  tax  rate  of 52.2  percent  for.-  34 -
over the  same  period. This large  differential  between  the
corporate-effective  and  statutory  income  tax  rates  in Zimbabwe  reflects  the
availability  of generous  tax  depreciation  allowances,  which  permit
companies  to fully  deduct  from  their  current  income  investment  expenditures
on a wide  array  of assets.
4.13  From  Table  4.3 it  can  also  be seen  that  net  interest  payments,  as
a percentage  of corporate  operating  income,  is relatively  low  in  Zimbabwe.
For  the  1980-1987  period,  this  amounts  to  an average  of 19  percent  for  all
listed  companies. This is  consistent  with  the  relatively  low  share  of debt
in the  corporate  capital  structure,  as discussed  in the  previous  chapter.
This,  in conjunction  with  the  relatively  low  effective  tax  rates,  implies
in essence  that  the  shareholder  in Zimbabwe  has  the  lion's  share  in
corporate  operating  income. This share  has  averaged  53  percent  for  the
listed  companies  as  a whole  for  1980-87. This,  however,  still  fails  to
capture  the  true  economic  share  of the  equity  holder  in corporate  operating
income. To arrive  at such  a concept  of  equity  income,  it is  necessary  to
make  adjustments  for  depreciation  in the  real  value  of debt  induced  by
inflation. Table  4.4  contains  the  final  results,  after  such  gearing
adjustments  are  made.  It is  thus  seen  that  shareholders  have earned,
during  the  period  1980-1987,  an average  return  on equity  of 22.6  and  15.7
percent  respectively  in local  and  foreign  companies. The  relatively  higher
return  on equity  in  local  companies  reflects  their  higher  degree  of
profitability.
Table  4.2  Estimates  of Pre-tax  a/ Rate  of  Return  on CaDital  Employed  b/
for  Local  and  Foreign  Non-Financial  CorRorations.  1980-1987
(percent)
Year  total  Foreign  Local
1980  19.13  19.40  18.31
1981  18.87  17.62  22.91
1982  13.95  11.77  20.71
1983  11.20  10.06  14.50
1984  11.63  11.08  13.28
1985  17.23  16.83  18.22
1986  15.81  15.48  16.61
1987  18.95  18.89  19.06
Average  15.85  15.14  17.95
#/  The  before-tax  rate  of return  is the  ratio  of operating  profits  net  of
depreciation  and  before  corporate  income  tax  to total  capital  employed.
h/  Capital  employed  is  defined  as the  sum  of plant,  equipment,  land,
inventories  and  non-interest  bearing  net  monetary  assets.
Source:  Company  accounts  of 48 listed  companies  on the  ZSE.- 35  -
Table  4.3  The  Distribution  of  Business  Oeraating  Income*/
into  its  Components,  1980-87
(percentage  of operating  income)
Net  Net
Year  Profit  Taxes  Interest
1980  61.77  28.84  9.39
1981  65.80  25.11  9.09
1982  47.70  30.31  21.99
1983  41.37  27.43  31.20
1984  42.25  29.05  28.70
1985  58.29  22.46  19.25
1986  54.53  27.47  17.99
1987  53.50  31.80  14.70
Average  53.15  27.81  19.04
a/  Operating  income  is  defined  as the  sum  of  net interest  payments,  direct
corporate  income  taxes  and  net  profits  before  taxes. Ratios  are  calculated
as percentage  distribution  of operating  income  into,  profits,  taxes,  and
net interest  payments.
Source:  Company  accounts  of 48 listed  compcnies  on the  ZSE.
Table  4.4  Estimates  of After-tax  Return  on Shareholders'  Equity  a/
for  Local  and  Foreign  Non-Financial  Corporations.  1980-87
(percent)
Year  Local  Foreign
1980  26.76  21.00
1981  30.73  21.20
1982  28.15  13.02
1983  21.40  12.79
1984  11.34  8.38
1985  18.31  16.39
1986  21.68  16.34
1987  22.45  17.06
Average  22.60  15.77
A/  Includes  adjustment  for  leverage  ratio.
Source:  Company  accounts  of  48 listed  companies  on the  ZSE.- 36  -.
The  Cost  of Capital
4.14  As already  discussed,  the  relevant  concept  of profitability  for
investment  decisions  is the  return  on  capital  relative  to the  cost  of
capital. What  matters  for  investment  is  not  just  how  much  a dollar  of
capital  invested  in  a  particular  project  earns,  but  also  how  much that  unit
of  capital  costs. Like  the  return  on investment,  the  cost  of  capital  is
subject  to  numerous  interpretations  and  measurements.  The  most  commonly
used concept  is the  cost  of funds,  which  is a  weighted  average  of the  cost
of debt  and  equity,  with  weights  reflecting  the  capital  structure  of the
company  or the  sector  concerned. For  corporations  in  Zimbabwe,  this
implies  that  the  cost  of funds  is  principally  determined  by the  cost  of
equity:  as discussed  previously,  the  share  of equity  in the  aggregate
financing  mix of listed  companies  is three  times  higher  than  the  share  cf
debt. At the  same  time  equity  is  much  more  expensive  than  debt.  Interest
expenses  in relation  to  total  debt  outstanding  have  averaged  (over  the
1981-i987  period)  12.2  and  12.4  percent  respectively  for  local  and foreign
companies. These  rates  are  strikingly  close  to the  commercial  banks'
minimum  lending  rate,  which  has remained  constant  at 13  percent  since  1981.
Furthermore,  taking  into  account  the  tax  deductibility  of business  interest
payments  and  inflation,  the  real  effective  i.e.  after-tax  cost  of debt  has,
of course,  been considerably  lower,  as shown  in  Table  4.5.  Indeed,  the
average  real  effective  rate  over  the  1981-1987  period  has  been  negative  for
both local  and  foreign  companies.
4.15  There  is greater  uncertainty  over  the  proper  concept  and
measurement  of the  cost  of equity  to corporations  in  Zimbabwe.  2/  For
local  companies,  such  a  cost  can  be measured  as the  return  on  alternative
investment  opportunities.  If  such  alternatives  are  assumed  to  be long-term
government  securities,  which  have  yielded  an  average  return  of 13
percent  Z./  over  the  1980-1987  period,  the  corresponding  cost  of equity  can
be taken  to  be in  the  order  of 15  to 18 percent,  if  an equity  risk  premium
of two  to five  percent  18  included.
j,/  In theory,  the  cost  of  equity  has  a straightforward  interpretation;  it
is the  discount  rate  that  equates  in  present  value  the  expected  future
stream  of firms'  dividend  payments  to the  market  value of its  stock.
Viewed  from  the  perspective  of the  stock  holders,  the  higher  the  degree
of uncertainty  attached  to the firms' dividend  payments or their
repatriation  in the  case  of foreign  companies,  the  higher  the  cost of
equity. In  other  words,  the  higher  the  degree  of  uncertainty  with  regard
to the  firms'  future  earnings  and  dividends,  the  higher  the  return  that
investors  require  in  order  to  be induced  to invest.
2-/  This is  the  average  yield  on 25-ye,rs  government  stocks.- 37  -
Table  4.5  The  Real  Effective  Cost  of  Debt'/  for
Local  and  Foreign  Non-Financial  Corporations.
1980-1987
(percent  per  annum)
Year  Local  Foraign
1980  -6.7  -4.8
1981  -3.83  -1.98
1982  -0.99  -0.33
1983  -4.26  -4.29
1984  1.33  2.35
1985  0.49  -1.08
1986  0.21  -0.2
1987  1.82  0.95
Average  -1.5  -1.16
a/  Real  after  tax  cost  of debt  calculated  as (l-u)R-x,  where  u is
corporate  tax  rate,  R is  nominal  effective  lending  :ste.  and  x is rate  of
inflation  (GDP  price  deflator).
4.16  Foreign-controlled  companies,  of course,  operate  under  different
sets  of constraints  and  objectives  than  their  local  counterparts.  These
companies  are  often  subsidiaries  of large  multinationals  with  world-wide
operations.  As such,  their  investment  and financing  policies  are  dependent
not  only  on local  conditions  and  regulations,  but  also  on the  broader
objectives  and  policies  of the  parents. Viewed  from  this  perspective,  the
expected  rate  of return  required  on an  additional  dollar  of investment  in
Zimbabwe  is the  opportunity  cost  of foregoing  an equivalent  investment  in
other  subsidiaries  in  other  parts  of the  globe. Returns  on these
investment  alternatives  have  become  increasingly  attractive  in the  1980s.
The average  return  on capital  employed  in  British  industrial  and  commercial
companies,  for  instance,  has  doubled  from  an estimate  of 6.4  percent  in
1980  to 11.5  percent  in 1987.  IV  Similar  increases  in  profitability  have
been common  in  other  industrial  countries. Indeed,  the  upward  trend  in  the
return  to  capital  in  industrial  countries  has  been an important  feature  of
these  countries'  developments  in the  1980s.
4.17  What these  increasing  trends  in  profitability  in industrial
countries  implies  is  that  the  opportunity  cust  of investing  in  Zimbabwe  (or
indeed,  in  most  other  parts  of the  eHeloping world)  has increased  in
2>./  See  Bank  of  Eng.and,  Ouarterly  Bulletin,  August  1988,  pp 379,  for  these
estimates.  Notc.  that  these  estimates  refer  to  the  pre-tax  rate  of  return
on  capital  employed,  where  capital  is  measured  at replacement  cost,  and
hence  they  are  not  directly  comparable  with  Zimbabwean  estimates  reported
in  Table  4.2.- 38  -
1980s. On top  of this  is  the  question  of the  degree  of uncertainty  with
regard  to future  dividend  payments  and  their  remittability  to foreign
shareholders.  This  constitutes  the  key factor  in  determining  the
risk-premium  that  is  attached  to the  cost  of equity  for  foreigr.  companies
in  Zimbabwe. In this  respect,  the  government  policy  of altering  the
remittance  ratio,  most  recently  to 25  percent  of after-tax  profits,  can  be
viewed  as contributing  to  an increase  the  cost  of equity. The  precise
impact  is difficult  to  gauge,  depending  on the  investor's  expectation  of
the  continuation  of this  level  of restrictions  on dividend  remittability
and  expected  disinvestment  options,  as  well  as company  earnings  and
dividend  policy. The  general  effect  has  been  captured  in the  quantitative
analysis  by adding  an  additional  risk  premium  to the  required  real  cost  of
equity  for  foreign  companies.
4.18  The  cost  of funds  is  only  one  component  of the  overall  cost  of
capital  which  is relevant  for  investment  decisions. For  investment  in
fixed  assets  (plant,  machinery,  and  equipment),  the  other  main  components
of the  cost  of capital  are:  the  acquisition  price  of capital,  i.e.,  the
cost  of acquiring  one  unit  of machinery  and  equipment,  taxation,
depreciation  allowances,  and the  cost  of  asset  decay;  i.e.,  real
depreciation  in terms  of wear  and  tear  and the  obsolescence  of fixed
assets.  2j/  The  procedure  for  incorporating  the  influence  of these  factors
on the  cost  of capital  under  the  Zimbabwean  tax  code  is described  in  Arnex
I,  where  a general  expression  for  the  real  cost  of capital  for  the
non-financial  corporate  sector  is  derived. The  Annex  also  contains  the
various  assumptions  underlying  our  estimates  of the  teal  cost  of capital
for  corporations  in Zimbabwe, The  results  for  both local  and  foreign
companies  are  shown  in Figure  4.2.  It is thus  noted  that  the  foreign
companies  face  a  much  higher  cost  of  capital  than  their  local  counterparts.
The  difference  for  1987,  for  instance,  is in  the  order  of six  percentage
points. For  the  period  1980-1987,  as a  whole,  the  cost  differential
between  the  foreign  and  local  companies  averages  7.5  percentage  points.
Two  reasons  explain  this  cost  differential:  the  higher  degree  of equity
financing  by foreign  companies  and  the  higher  degree  of risk  premium
attached  to investment  in  Zimbabwe  by foreign  shareholders.  In  essence,
the  foreign  companies  rely  relatively  more  on equity  financing,  which  is in
Zimbabwe  the  more  expensive  source  of finance.
4.19  For  both the  local  and  foreign  companies,  Figure  4.2  shows  a
sharp  increase  in the  real  cost  of capital  since  1984. This stems  from  a
combination  of several  factors,  including:  (i)  a reduction  in the  rate  of
inflation  in 1984,  from  an average  rate  of 15  percent  in the  previous  three
years  (1981-1983)  to less  than  ten  percent  from  1984;  (ii)  an increase  in
the  corporate  income  tax  rate;  (iii)  higher  fnterest  rates;  and (iv)  a
sharp  increase  in the  real  price  of  capital  goods  (see  Figure  4.3).  The
overall  impact  has  been to  raise  the  real  cost  of capital  to  an annual
The  real  cost  of  capital  can  be expressed  as (taxes).  (Real  price  of  capital
goods) [cost  of funds and rate of asset decay - rate of depreciation
allowances). Numberical  value,  for 1987 and for foreign  companies,  are:
(2.074)  (1.286)  [6.169  +  5 - 5.411  - 16.45- 39  -
average  of 9.1  percent  over  1984-1987  period  for  local  companies,  compared
to a corresponding  rate  of 3.1  percent  in  1980-1983  period. Of this
increase,  roughly  22  percent  can  be directly  attributed  to  higher  capital
goods  prices  22,  and the  rest  to inflation,  higher  interest  rates  and
higher  corporate  income  taxes.
4.20  In  conclusion,  the  real  cost  of  capital  is relatively  high in
Zimbabwe,  and this  is  especially  so for  foreign  corporations.  This is  due
largely  to the  high risk  premium  associated,  inter  alia  with uncertainties
over  dividend  remittability,  that  raises  the  cost  of equity,  and  the  high
price  of capital  goods. Both  can  be traced,  at least  in part,  to the
workings  of the  foreign  exchange  allocation  system. High  corporate  tax
rates  also  tend  to raise  the  cost  of  capital,  but this  is  offset  by the
generous  tax  allowances.  Interest  rates  are  not an important  factor. lt
might  be added  that  this  could  still  be an  underestimate  for  the  average
cost  of capital  for  firms,  since  those  prevented  from  investing  because  of
quantitative  restrictions  technically  face  an infinite  cost  of capital  at
that  moment. The overall  problem  outlined  at the  beginning  of this  chapter
has  apparently  not  been so  much  that  profitability  has  been  low  as the  cost
of capital  has  been  high.  Policy  measures  geared  to stimulate  corporate
fixed  investment  thus  need to  deal  with the  current  high  cost  of capital
and  especially  the  high  perceived  risks  of investment.  This  is taken  up in
Chapter  6.
21/  This is  based  on the  comparison  between  the  actual  real  cost  of  capital
during 1984-1987  period and its value if capital goods prices had
remained  constant  in  real  terms  during  1984-1987  period.  Thus,  under  the
constant  capital  goods  price  scenario,  the  real  cost  of  capital  for  local
companies  would have averaged  over 1984-1987  period to 7.4 percent,
compared  to the  actual  rate  of 9.1  percent._  40  -
Figure  4.2
The  Real  Cost  of  Capital,  Local  an4 Foreign  Companies,  1980-87
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5.  THE  REGULATORY  FRAMEWORK  FOR  CORPORATE INVESTKENT
5.1  Extensive  regulation  and  administrative  control  was  part  of
Zimbabwe's  inheritance  at independence  and  has  continued  to  be central  to
economic  policy. Despite  rapid  growth  of the  public  sector  since  1980  the
private  sector  is  still  dominant  in  the  commodity-producing  sectors.
However,  the  Governmont  exerts  considerable  influence  over  the  broad  areas
of  price  determination  for  many  commodities,  allocation  of foreign
exchange,  and the  investment  decision-making  process. In the  area  of the
investment  process,  these  interventions  are  concentrated  in  the  project
appraisal  and  approval  stage,  rather  than  in the  planning  and
implementation  stage. Under  the  prevailing  regulatory  framework,  all
companies,  regardless  of their  ownership  status,  need  to obtain  project
approval  from  the  Industrial  Projects  Committee  (IPC),  before  they  can
obtain  the  foreign  currency  allocation  recuired  for  the  importation  of the
necessary  capital  equipment. The  process  is  cumbersome,  entailing  lags  of
10 or even  14  months. Although  there  have  been some  improvements  in the
past  year,  especially  for  investments  from  blocked  funds  since  the  May 1987
announcements,  the  time  and  uncertainty  associated  with the  process  remains
a  pervasive  concern.
5.2  The extent  and  nature  of government  interventions  in  the  planning
stage  of investment  process  varies,  however,  according  to the  ownership
status  of the  enterprise  concerned. Beside  the  restrictions  implied  by
prevailing  price  controls,  which  is firm  specific,  the  local  companies  are
generally  treated  more generously  and  more favorably  than  their  foreign
counterparts.  With regard  to  their  choices  over  project  selection,
financial  and  dividend  policy,  local  companies  have full  autonomy. Thus,
their  decisions  over  the  amount  of investment,  type  of assets,  funding  and
retention  policies  are  internal  to their  corporate  organization  and  are
governed  by relevant  macro  and  financial  considerations.  In  contrast,  the
foreign-controlled  companies  operate  in a tight  web of regulations  and
restrictions.  These  regulations  relate  to  strict  limitations  imposed  on
their  ability  to raise  funds  locally  and  to  distribute  their  earnings  as
well  as the  slow  process  of assessment  new investment  proposals. Here  we
first  review  the  context  for  the  regulation  of foreign  capital,  including
recent  changes  in  policy,  and  then  discuss  the  complementary  aspects  of
domestic  regulation.
Foreign  Capital  and  Government  Policy: A Strategic  Interaction
5.3  The regulatory  framework  for  foreign  companies  needs  to  be cast
in  a broader  context. Because  foreign  controlled  companies  control  the
dominant  share  of assets  in the  Zimbabwean  corporate  structure,  they  have
unavoidably  become  targets  of public  policy  debate. The  debate  has
centered,  in  particular,  around  three  issues:  (i)  the  degree  of autonomy
and flexibility  over  project  approval  and  appraisal;  (ii)  dividend
remittability;  and (iii)  management  of financial  surplus  funds. These
represent  important  aspects  of companies'  investment  and  financial  policy,
which,  in  the  context  of  most  countries,  are  subject  to  the  discretion  of
the  management  of the  company  concerned  and  are  carried  out  within  the- 42 -.
market-determined  structure  of risks  and  returns. The  difference  in  the
case  of Zimbabwe  arises  partly  from  the  Government's  policy  of
subordinating  dividend  remittances  to  other  claims  within  the  country's
tight  supply  of foreign  exchange,  and  partly  from  its  basic  policy  of
exerting  direct  influence  on the  process  of private  investment  in  order  to
allocate  resources  to social  and  economic  priorities.
5.4  The fact  that  remittance  of dividends  has so far  fallen  victim  to
balance  of payments  adjustments  can  lead  to increased  uncertainty  and,
hence,  to an erosion  of  foreign  investors'  confidence.  As we saw  in
Chapter  4, the  inclusion  of some  measure  of this  risk  premium  has  a major
impact  on the  cost  of  capital  for  foreign  firms  and  the  uncertainty  over
the  amount  of dividends  that  can  be remitted  to foreign  share-holders
appears  to  have  been a  major  source  of tension  between  the  Government  and
foreign  companies. While  much is  made of the  implicit  tax  on the
companies'  shareholders,  it  should,  however,  be emphasized  that  allowable
remittances  are  not  out  of line  with  corporate  practices  world  wide.  In
fact,  even  the  recently  reduced  25 per-ent  ratio  of after  tax  profits  that
are  remittable  under  the  May  1987  declaration  (see  below)  is in line  with
the  average  dividend  pay-out  ratio  of companies  in industrial
countries. WL/  Again  it is the  impact  on  uncertainty--the  fear  that
dividends  will  be permanently  restricted--that  matters. Conversely,  a
higher  remittable  rate  of return  to  shareholders  is  required  ex  ante to
cover  the  higher  perceived  risks  of doing  business.
5.5  Perceived  from  the  viewpoint  of foreign-controlled  companies,
there  is  also  an important  element  of strategic  behavior;  thus  their
reluctance  to invest  may  be seen  as a strategic  tactic  intended  to  elicit
more  favorable  terms  and to  establish  a set  of ground  rules  which  would  be
more  akin  to their  long-term  interest. Within  this  context  of strategic
interaction,  companies  have the  ultimate  option  of not investing  or
disinvesting.  This  imposes  on the  Government  both the  direct  cost  of
depriving  it  from  the  usual  tax  and  other  revenues  and  the  indirect  social
and  economic  costs  of lower  investment  levels,  including  a  higher  level  of
unemployment.  Such  an option,  howev..;r,  would  impinge  on the  companies  two
types  of costs:  the  cost  of losing  investment  and  profit  opportunities;  and
the  cost  of facing  a more  competitive  environment,  should  the  Government
encourage  entry  of  newcomers  through  discriminatory  treatment. For  the
existing  companies,  however,  the  sheer  benefit  of being  inside  (which  saves
them  from  agency  cost)  places  them  in  a strongly  advantageous  position.
5.6  In terms  of examining  strategic  interactions  between  foreign
capital  and  the  Government,  it  is important  to  emphasize  the  diversity  of
the  foreign-controlled  sector. At the  cost  of oversimplification,  three
broad  groups  can  be distinguished  in relation  to  their  attitude  to
disinvestment  and  potential  new investment:  established  investors  that  have
made a strategic  decision  to leave  Zimbabwe;  established  investors  that
2/  The average dividend  pay-out ratio (over 1980-84 period) for the
aggregate  non-financial  sector  of  major  industrial  countries  ranges  from
6.4  percent  in Finland  to 23.1  percent  in  the  United  Kingdom._ 43  -
have  made  a long-term  commitment  to stay;  and  potential  new investors.  The
first  group  is  predominantly  interested  in the  best  terms  it  can  obtain  for
disinvestment  and, in  the  meantime,  the  maximization  of short-run  protits.
The second  would  be expected  to  be more  concerned  with the  rules  of the
game  for  current  activities  and, in  common  with the  third  group,  obtaining
the  best longer  term  position  for  future  investments  and  profits.
Government  policy  and  expectations  over  the  future  have,  of  course,  a
strong  influence  over  the  proportion  of existing  firms  that  fall  into  each
of the  first  two  groups.
5.7  There  have  been a  number  of changes  in  the  regulatory  environment
for  foreign  investors  in  the  1980s. Despite  the  Government's  public
concern  over  the  proportion  of the  economy  owned  by foreign  capital,  there
was initially  an improvement  in the  terms  for  most investor  categories.
Those  firms  whose  remittances  had  been fully  blocked  during  the  UDI  period
(primarily  British  companies)  were  allowed  to remit  up to  50  percent  of
their  post-tax  profits  (subject  to a  withholding  tax  of 20 percent  that
could  be offset  against  taxes  in the  home  country). At the  same  time,  the
concept  of wventure  capital"  was introduced  for  new  investments,  with
relatively  favorable  disinvestment  provisions.  This  was  designed  to
effectively  discriminate  between  new  and  pre-independence  investments.
However,  despite  these  provisions,  new investors  were  clearly  reluctant  to
invest  in Zimbabwe. Much  was  made  by the  multinationals  of the
Government's  refusal  to sign  the  OPIC  agreement  (on  the  grounds  that  the
investor's  rights  were  already  covered  by the  constitution).  Then,  in
1984,  the  worsening  external  position  led  to  the  government  decision  to
temporarily  disallow  remittances  for  pre-1979  investments--there  was a
clear  choice  to subordinate  the  claims  of foreign  equity  holders  to
Zimbabwe's  foreign  creditors. This  was lifted  in  early  1986,  with  the
restoration  of 50  percent  remittability  (and  accumulated  claims  allowed  to
go out  through  five-year  bonds),  but in  May 1987  this  was  again  reduced  to
25  percent  of  post-tax  profits. In  neither  case  were the  terms  of  venture
capital  affected,  either  with  respect  to remittability  or  disinvestment
rights.
5.8  The  May 1987  reduction  of remittability  was  accompanied  by other
measures  designed  to encourage  foreign-controlled  firms  to invest  in
Zimbabwe. This  focused  on the  blocked  and  surplus  funds  of established
companies.  22/ Two  measures  were introduced:  a reduction  in the  allowed
rate  of interest  on these  funds  from  ten  percent  to five  percent;  and  the
introduction  of  new, somewhat  liberalized,  procedures  for  approval  of
domestic  investments  out  of these  resources,  that  would  also  give the  new
investments  venture  capital  status,  with  the  relatively  favorable
conditions  this  confers. There  is little  information  on the  level  of
investment  activity  from  these  funds. The  bulk  of the  funds  have  continued
to add  to the  liquidity  of the  monetary  system,  and  there  is  also  reported
22/ Blocked  funds  are  legally  eligible  for  expatriation,  but  are  prevented
from  this  by  the  current  restrictions;  surplus  funds  are  owned  by foreign
firms,  but are not eligible  for expatriation,  for example  post-tax
profits  that  are  not  declared  as dividends  to foreign  share-holders.- 44  -
to  continue  to  be a significant  waiting  period  while  the  new  committee
reviews  proposals  submitted. In  view  of the  analysis  in  Chapters  2 and  4
on the  main factors  affecting  the  cost  of capital  and investment  levels,  it
would  be surprising  if  the  reduction  in interest  on alternative  domestic
financial  assets  had  any influence  on the  decision  to invest. Indeed  the
principal  effect  has  been to transfer  profits  to the  largely  foreign-owned
banking  sector. In  recognition  of this, the  Government  imposed  in  mid-
1988  a supplementary  tax  on  banks  having  this  category  of deposits.
5.9  There  has  been  much  more activity  in  relation  to  disinvestment.
Since  around  1985,  foreign  firms  wishing  to  disinvest  have gone  through  two
main  routes:  sale  at a  discount  of  between  40 and  60  percent  of  net asset
value  to either  the  Government,  a cooperative  or a group  with a  majority  of
black  Zimbabweans  ownership,  and  subsequent  expatriation  of the  receipts  in
six-year  Z$  bonds  bearing  an interest  rate  of four  perceint;  or sale  at a
discount  of 70  percent  of  net  asset  value  to the  same  categories  of
domestic  groups,  with the  sale  proceeds  expatriated  over  one  or two
years.  IQ/  It  was announced  in  early  1989  that  the  terms  for  the  second
category  have  changed  with a required  discount  of at least  80 percent  and
sale  to "approved  Zimbabwean  investors".  While  figures  are  not  available,
there  is reported  to  have  been a flurry  of disinvestment  activity  in the
past two  years,  both  tc the  private  sector,  including  a number  of leveraged
management  buyouts,  and  a smaller  number  of  major  sales  to the  Government.
5.10  Finally,  the  Government  has  recently  been in the  process  of
reviewing  the  framework  for  new  foreign  investors  and  has announced  that  it
will  issue  new guidelines  in  the  first  half  of 1989. These  are  expected  to
focus  on the  three  areas  of the  procedures  for  investment  approval,  the
conditions  of investment  (notably  on remittability)  and  guarantees.
5.11  In conclusion,  two  observations  are  relevant  to the  regulation  of
foreign  investment.  First,  in  the  design  of  policy,  it  is important  to
explicitly  distinguish  between  the  different  categories  of investors  noted
and  outlined  in  para  5.6. The  Zimbabwean  Government  has  been attempting  to
do just this,  but the  only  area  of "success"  has  been in  allowing  an
accelerated  pace  of disinvestment  at a substantial  discount. Attempts  to
encourage  higher  investment  from  either  existing  or new investors  have  had
little  impact  on investment  levels. Second,  the  evidence  on rates  of
return  and  on characteristic  levels  of dividend  payout  suggest  that  actual
profit  levels--the  terms  of the  relationship  between  the  country  and the
foreign  investor--are  not  bad.  The focus  of attention  for  new investment
needs  to  be on issues  associated  with  uncertainty  and  with the  perceived
rules  of the  game,  including  approval  procedures  for  new investments.
These  policy  questions  are  taken  up in  Chapter  6.
J/  These  do not  affect  the  existing  alternative  of purchase  of 12 or 20-
year (for individuals  and companies)  Z$ bonds  bearing  a four  percent
interest  rate. As noted  above,  the  terms  for  venture  capital  are  more
generous  and  have  not changed.- 45  -
Domestic  Investment  Regulation  and  Foreign  Exchange  Allocation
5.12  As noted  above,  there  is little  direct  regulation  of investment
by domestic  firms,  in  contrast  to the  foreign-controlled  sector. However,
this  has essentially  not  been an issue,  since  the  centralized  control  of
foreign  exchange  allocation  and  external  borrowing  by the  private  sector
gives  the  Government  effectively  full  approval  powers  over  any  private
investment  decision  (or  any  decision  by a joint  venture  of publicly  owned
business  for  that  matter). Investments  with  no foreign  exchange  content
are  not  covered,  but these  are  of negligible  importance  for  the  corporate
sector. Thus  the  committee  system  for  foreign  exchange  allocation
constitutes  a de facto  investment  regulation  system. The  principal
reported  criteria  for  approval  include  net foreign  exchange  earnings
(probably  the  most critical  one),  employment,  regional  location  and  the
priority  of the  proposed  investment.  In addition  to approval  of resources
for  capital  goods  imports  (or  borrowing  for  this  purpose),  approval  by the
appropriate  committee  in  effect  confers  a right  to a share  of the  cake  in
future  allocations  of foreign  exchange  for  current  imports. It is  clear
that  any  conclusions  on investment  approval  have  to  be cast  within  the
context  of the  Government's  decisions  on any  reform  of the  overall  foreign
exchange  allocation  system. Equally,  if there  is  a decision  to  undertake
some  form  of trade  liberalization,  policy  toward  investment  regulation  will
have to  be directly  tackled. This is  taken  up in the  final  chapter.
5.13  There  has  been one  effective  modification  to the  foreign  exchange
allocation  system  for  investment,  through  allowing  selected  financial
institutions  to  directly  lend  in foreign  exchange  to  businesses,  provided
the  foreign  exchange  risk  is  passed  on to the  final  borrower. The two
cases  involve  the  Zimbabwe  Development  Bank (ZDB)  and  a  merchant  bank,  UDC
ltd. In  both cases,  approval  by the  Industrial  Projects  Committee  is still
required,  but it is  reported  that  this  generally  goes  through  quickly,  in
contrast  to applications  for  the  IPC's  'own'  resources. Both  have  been
functioning  for  several  years,  but  demand  for  the  resources  has  been  much
less  than  would  have  been expected,  given  the  general  emphasis  in the
private  sector  on the  severity  of the  foreign  exchange  constraint.  The
principal  reported  deterrent  has  been the  need  to  assume  foreign  exchange
risk (combined  with  relatively  high interest  rates)--in  the  case  of
allocations  by the  IPC,  the  Government  bears  the  full  foreign  exchange
risk.  This  again  reveals  the  high  degree  of risk  aversion  of the  corporate
sector. In response  to  the  private  sector's  generai  fears  over  foreign
exchange  risk,  the  Government  announced  a  new facility  in  mid-1988  that
would  extend  forward  cover  on foreign  exchange  to four  years  at a cost  of
five  per-ent  per  annum. This is  unusually  generous  by international
standards. As of end-1988  there  was  no information  on the  workings  of this
new  facility.
5.14  The final  issue  of relevance  to investment  regulation  concerns
the  potential  impact  of other  aspects  of the  regulatory  system  to
investment  decisions. Job  security  regulations--the  requirement  that  the
Government  approve  virtually  any  layoff  by a  business--raises  the  expected
fixed  costs  associated  with  any  investment  and  increase  the  likely  risk  of
losses,  especially  in  years  of recession. Price  controls  have  a more
ambiguous  effect. The  private  sector  has  always  complained  about  them,  but- 46  -
it is  not  clear  that  they  actually  increased  perceived  risks  in the  past,
since  they  have  been largely  operated  in  terms  of markups  over  costs,  i.e.
as  a guarantee  of reasonable  profitst However,  the  introduction  of the
price  freeze  in  mid-1987  and  the  considerable  uncertainty  over  how it  will
be fully  unwound,  has undoubtedly  had  an adverse  impact  on expected  profits
and  investment  intentions.- 47 -
6.  POLICY  CONCLUSIONS
6.1  The  sources  of  weak  private  investment  are  complex. Adjustments
in  conventional  areas  of influence  on  private  investment  are  unlikely  to
work  when the  problem  also  lies  in the  overall  environment  for  investment
decision-making  and  intangible  perceptions  of future  risks. A recovery  in
private  business  investment  will  require  a range  of  policy  a4justments
designed  to encourage  the  underlying  demand  for  expansion  in capacity,
relax  supply-side  constraints  on investment,  facilitate  investment
decision-making,  and  reduce  the  perceived  risks  of investment.  The
Government  is in the  process  of reviewing  the  envirunment  for  private
investment  and is  expected  to issue  new  guidelines  for  foreign  investors  in
the  first  half  of 1989. This  is an important  area,  but  needs  to  be cast  in
the  context  of  other  influences  on  private  investment.  This  section  pulls
together  conclusions  in seven  areas  that  could  contribute  to the
development  of a supportive  overall  framework  for  a recovery  in  private
investment:  the  macroeconomic  and  financial  framework;  foreign  exchange  and
supply-side  constraints;  investment  appraisal;  financial  sector
development;  complementary  regulatory  issues;  the  tax/incentive  framework
for  investment;  and  the  environment  for  foreign  investment,  including  the
management  of disinvestment.  The  relationship  of these  policy  areas  to the
key issues  in  supporting  a sustained  recovery  are  outlined  in Table  6.1.
Table  6.1  Issues  and  Policy  Areas  for  a Private  Investment  Recovery
Issue  Policy  Area
Reducing  Supply-side  Constraints  Foreign  exchange  availability  and
related  supply-side  factors
Appropriate  financial  framework  and
financial  sector  development.
Reducing  risks  Sustainable  environment  through
macroeconomic  adjustment  and
changes  in  regulatory  environment
Foreign  investment  environment
Foreign  exchange  risk
Facilitating  decision-making  Investment  appraisal  and  the
financial  system
Encouraging  demand  for  Macroeconomic  framework
capacity  expansion
Encouraging  efficient  investment  Tax/incentive  framework
choices
Broadening  ownership  Disinvestment  policy
Financial  sector  development48  -
6.2  As noted  at the  beginning  of this  paper,  an overall  assumption  is
that  the  Government  is  committed  to  maintaining  a significant  role for  the
private  sector  i.e.  the  focus  is  on  how to  support  a recovery  in  private
business  investment  within  a mixed  economy. In addition,  policy
conclusions  need  to pay  attention  to two  special  factors:  first,  that  the
key issue  is  not  to improve  current  profits,  but  to raise  expected  future
profits,  through  reducing  the  perceived  risks  of investment;  second,  that
the  Government  has an objective  of increasing  domestic,  and  especially
black  Zimbabwean,  ownership.
A.  The  Macroeconomic  and  Financial  Framework
6.3  The  macroeconomic  framework  needs  to  have three  features  If
business  investment  is  to recover:  first,  sufficient  growth  in demand  for
firms  to  experience  growth  in  capacity  utilization  and thereby  increase  the
underlying  desire  for  investment;  second,  adjustment  in  domestic  resource
imbalances  to  ensure  adequate  domestic  srvings  for  investment;  and  third,
to the  extent  feasible,  assurances  of reasonable  stability  in  overall
macroeconomic  conditions.
6.4  The  management  of the  budget  deficit  is the  main  factor  here. At
first  sight  there  are  conflicts  between  the  first  two  objectives:  growth  in
demand  would  seem  to imply  maintaining  or increasing  the  deficit,  whilst
freeing  up savings  for  business  investment  suggests  the  opposite. This
needs  to  be put into  a medium-term  context. The  current  budget  deficit  is
nrt  sustainable--it  has  been  financed  in the  past few  years  through  the
creation  of a  private  sector  net savings  rate  of 8-10  percent  of GDP:  this
is  not  consisto~nt  with  a sustained  recovery  in  private  sector  demand;  in
addition,  the  dynamics  of rising  interest  payments  on  public  debt  will
gradually  catch  up with  deficit  finance. So any  adjustment  needs  to
include  a significant,  medium-term  decline  in  net  public  sector  resource
use  in the  economy.
To avoid  cutbacks  in  public  services  and  public  investment,  the  bulk  of
this  would  need  to come  from  a reduced  share  of public  spending  (especially
subsidies)  in  GDP.
6.5  The  objective,  then,  is to  reduce  the  deficit  in the  context  of
steady  growth  in demand:  deficit  reduction  alone  could  lead  to recessionary
adjustment  that  would  quickly  choke  off  any investment  recovery. This
requires  complementary  measures  to stimulate  export  and  private  domestic
demand  and  sufficient  flexibility  in  the  public  sector  resource  position  to
allow  temnrary stimulation  of demand  when  necessary. This  requires  a more
detailed  macroeconomic  analysis  that  has  not  been  undertaken  for  this
paper,  but the  following  conclusions  can  be drawn  from  previous  work.
(i)  There  is a  need to  stimulate  export  demand  through  a mixture
of exchange  rate  movement  and  other  special  incentives.  This  is  now  an
important  part  of government  policy  and  central  to the  assessment  of the
options  for  trade  liberalization;  the  issues  are  not  discussed  further
here.- 49  -
(ii) Managing  the  growth  in  domestic  private  sector  demand  is
more  complex. Obvious  instruments--tax  reductions,  wage increeses,  reduced
(real)  prices  of controlled  products--conflict  with  other  requirements  of
the  structural  adjustment  process. Of more importance  may  be a careful
relaxation  of the import  constraint:  in  view  of the  past import
compression,  increased  current  imports  (especially  of intermediates  and  raw
materials)  can  help  support  a private  sector  recovery  through  the  direct
impact  on  capacity  utilization  and indirect  effects  through  input  demand
and,  in some  cases,  increased  labor  income. If  export  growth  is  sluggish,
some  increase  in  borrowing  may  be necessary,  but this  needs  to  be managed
carefully  to ensure  consistency  with  both  aggregate  external  borrowing
limits  and  the  competing  demands  for  foreign  borrowing  from  public  and
private  sector  investment.  Price  adjustments,  including  exchange  rate
movement  and  excises  on luxury  consumer  goods,  can  also  help the  process
though  encouraging  switching  of the  underlying  (non-rationed)  demand  away
from  imports  and  moderating  the  impact  of  private  demand  growth  on the
trade  balance.
(iii) The  key  to  effective  budgetary  adjustment  is  an increase
in the  "discretionary"  component  of the  deficit,  i.e.  that  portion  of the
deficit  that  can  be relatively  easily  adjusted. Macroeconomic  analysis
indicates  that  a reduction  in the  deficit  of  betweer.  1.5  and  2.5  percent  of
GDP  per  annum  over  the  next  two  to three  years  is likely  to  be consistent
with the  steady  growth  in  demand  that  will support  an investment  recovery.
Under  these  circumstances  it  would  be  highly  desirable  to  make  adjustments
on the  "structural"  deficit  of,  say,  2.5  percent  of GDP  per  annum,  and
either  keep  some  spending  in  reserve,  or include  easily  postponable
expenditure  items  in the  budget,  e.g. in  the  investment  program,  in  order
to  provide  the  Government  with the  flexibility  to  deal  either  with
overheating  or inadequate  demand  in  the  economy.
6.6  Reductions  in  the  deficit  that  are  clearly  based  in  structural
changes  in public  sector  resource  use  are  also  the  key  to the  perceived
macroeconomic  stability  of the  country. The  business  sector  is
sophisticated  and  is  vividly  aware  of the  future  risks  that  current
deficits  bring  and  also  of the  often  gloomy  content  of recent  budget
speeches. Thus  the  perception  of  a serious  effort  to  tackle  the  sources  of
the  deficit  would  be a  major  gain  for  the  business  environment. It  will
also  be necessary  to the  achievement  of greater  domestic  price  stability.
However,  low  inflation  rates  are  less  assured  in the  short  run  in  view  of
the likelihood  of a surge  in  inflation  in  response  to the  unwinding  of the
price  freeze  and  the  need  for  further  adjustments  in  controlled  prices
(including  continued  depreciation  of the  exchange  rate). This  is likely  to
be unavoidable  and  the  main  questions  concern  how to  manage  it  without
exacerbating  relative  price  distortion  and  then  how to set  in  train  a
disinflationary  process  that  does  not lead  to  a recesslon  in the  real
economy.  W/
6.7  Adjustments  in the  real  imbalances  associated  with  public  sector
deficits  will  have a  major  influence  on the  pattern  of financial  sector
IV  See  Chhibber  et al (1989)  for  a discussion  of these  issues.- so  -
resource  use.  An investment  recovery  will lead  to  growth  in  private  sector
demand  for  credit--initially  for  working  capital  and  subsequently  for  fixed
investment.  As Chapter  3 showed,  there  could  be quite  a large  increase  in
the  corporate  sector's  demand  for  funds. The  most  effective  way  of
providing  for  this  could  be a (gradual)  relaxation  in  the  restrictions  on
financial  institutions,  of  which  the  most  important  is  that  60  percent  of
institutional  investors'  assets  be invested  in "prescribed'  (public  sector)
liabilities.  More  conventionally,  lower  use  of credit  from  the  monetary
sector  from  the  whole  public  sector  (including  the  Agricultural  Marketing
Authority)  would  allow  growth  in  private  credit  demand.
B.  Foreign  Exchange  and  SuDlv-side Constraints
6.8  A recovery  in investment  will require  an increased  supply  of its
three  components:  foreign  exchange  for  imported  investment  goods;  domestic
capital  goods;  and  domestic  construction  goods. The first  is likely  to
constitute  the  severest  constraint  for  the  corporate  sector,  in  view  of the
predominance  of  modern  manufacturing  and  mining  activities  whose  productive
capital  has a  critical,  and  often  large,  import  content. So increases  in
foreign  exchange  for  private  sector  investment  goods  is likely  to  be a
necessary  condition  for  growth  in  corporate  investment.  Given  the  general
foreign  exchange  constraint,  and  the  low  probability  of major  foreign
investment  inflows,  it  would  be appropriate  to allow  increased  external
borrowing  to finance  private  corporate  investment  in the  short  and  medium
term.  The  level  of such  borrowing  would  depend  on  both the  ove)aall
external  debt  position  and the  appropriate  division  of investment  between
the  public  and  private  sector. In the  assessment  of appropriate  levels  of
borrowing  for  public  sector  projects,  it is  important  Xo  take  account  of
this  private  sector  demand  for  external  finance  for  investment.
6.9  The form  of  borrowing  for  private  investment  will  depend  on the
policy  regime  for  foreign  exchange  allocation. If the  Government  maintains
the  existing  system  intact,  then  increased  borrowings  could  occur  either
via  higher  approvals  for  individual  private  sector  projects  by the  External
Loans  Coordinating  Committee,  or increased  borrowing  for  investment
purposes  by the  Government  or financial  intermediary  (such  &s the  Zimbabwe
Development  Bank)  with  the  allocation  across  projects  decided  at a
subsequent  stage,  by the  Industrial  Projects  Committee  or financial
institution.  If the  Government  shifted  to  less  specific  allocation  of
resources  in this  area--as  recommended  in  the  next  section--it  would  still
probably  be appropriate  to  maintain  overall  controls  on private  sector
borrowing,  but greater  reliance  would  then  be placed  on external  borrowings
to finance  investment  facilities  managed  within  the  financial  system.
While in  the  long  run  a relaxation  of restrictions  on  external  foreign
borrowing  by the  private  sector  would  be desirable,  during  the  transitional
period  it  would  be appropriate  for  control  to  be maintained,  given  both the
continuance  of controls  elsewhere  in the  system  and  the  initial  excess
demand  for  foreign  exchange. Levels  of borrowing  for  private  investment
should  then  be based  on an overall  external  and  domestic  financial
programming  exercise.
6.10  The  question  of  borrowing  for  private  sector  investment  leads
directly  to the  management  of foreign  exchange  risk. As noted  in  Chapter- 51  -
5,  until  the  recent  change,  the  Government  operated  a  dualistic  system.
For  projects  funded  from  the  Industrial  Projects  Committee  resources,  the
Government  bore the  whole  risk  and  private  firms  financed  the  foreign
exchange  purchase  from  domestic  resources  (generally  internally  generated).
There  are  reportedly  queues  for  IPC  resources. Oni  the  other  hand,  firms
going  to ZDB  or  udc ltd.  in the  financial  system  for  foreign  exchange  for
investment  had to  bear  the  whole  risk. Queues  have  been  much  shorter  here.
The  new  scheme  that  provides  foreign  exchange  cover  for  four  years
represents  a compromise  in  these  circumstances:  it  allows  firms  to
eliminate  risk,  but  at a cost. At a charge  of five  percent  per  annum  there
would  be no transfer  between  the  Government  and  users  of the  facility  if
the  exchange  rate  experiences  a  nominal  depreciation  at the  same  zate  of
five  percent  per  annum. This  compares  with  a pace  of  nominal  depreciation
of 8.5  percent  per annum  against  a trade  weighted  basket  in the  1983-87
period  i.e.  the  current  terms  appear  quite  generous  to users,  especially  as
it  provides  for  full  cover,  with  no risk-sharing.  In  view of these
favorable  terms,  it  would  now  be desirable  to remove  the  dualism  from  the
system  and  pass  on the  foreign  exchange  risk  for  resources  from  the  IPC  and
allow  users  to cover  the  risk  with the  new  facility. While  many  countries
have some  form  of risk-sharing  with the  private  sector,  a system  in  which
the  Government  assumes  foreign  exchange  risk  makes  sense  in the  absence  of
any  market  mechanism  for  the  private  sector  to cover  its  risk.  It  should
be noted  that  even  the  full  coverage  of foreign  exchange  risk  should  not  be
construed  as  restricting  the  Government's  exchange  rate  management  policy.
It  just  modifies  and  makes  more  transparent  one  component  of the  complex
public-private  resource  movements  that  occur  when the  exchange  rate
adjusts.
6.11  With  respect  to supply-side  constraints  for  the  capital  goods  22/
and  construction  sectors,  the  most  frequently  cited  factor  is  again
indirect  foreign  exchange  requirements  for  intermediate  inputs  and
equipment. This implies  that  measures  designed  to stimulate  an investment
recovery,  including  increased  direct  foreign  exchange,  should  be
accompanied  by policies  to  relax  these  indirect  requirements.  If the
Government  adopts  a  phased  approach  to trade  liberalization,  it  would  be
preferable  to include  the  capital  goods  subsector  early  in  any  sequence  of
shifts  from  foreign  exchange  rationing  to  a system  of tariff-based
protection.  Similar  considerations  apply  to  the  construction  sector.
6.12  These  sectors  also  suffer  from  other  constraints,  though  these
are  less  obvious  at present  since  most  firms  are  not running  at full
capacity. For  the  capital  goods  subsector,  skilled  labor  could  become  a
problem  in the  event  of rapid  growth--early  movement  to  maintain  the
quality  and  output  of the  system  of technical  education  would  be desirable
here.  It is  also  necessary  that  iron  and  steel  policy  ensures  an adequate
supply  of quality  steel  products  (that  will  often  have to  continue  to  be
imported). In the  construction  sector,  the  main  problem  appears  to  be the
scarcity  of  middle  level  management:  blacks  were  excluded  from  managerial
JZ/  The issues  for  the  capital  goods  sector  are  discussed  in the  companion
paper  on this,  see  World  Bank (1989).- 52  -
positions  prior  to independence  and  the  development  of a  cadre  of
experienced  managers  can  take  well  over  a  decade. Little  can  be done in
the  short  run:  some  liberalization  of policy  on expatriates  may  be
justified,  but this  is  generally  a costly  and  unsatisfactory  method  of
developing  domestic  experience  and  expertise. Continued  pressure  on the
private  sector  to recruit,  train  and  give  responsibility  to  black
Zimbabweans  would  be appropriate. In  addition,  for  all  sectors,  a
reduction  in specific  interventions  associated  with  the  existing  regime  of
resource  regulation  can  directly  relieve  the  burden  of  working  within  the
system;  thereby  freeing  up all  managers'  time  for  production  and  marketing-
related  activities.
C.  Investment  ADoraisal
6.13  The third  area  of  policy  focus  should  be on facilitating  the
private  sector's  decision-making  process  over  investment.  The special
issues  for  foreign  investors  are  discussed  below  and  we focus  here  on other
aspects  of investment  regulation.  The  current  investment  committee
approval  system  both  restricts  the  private  sector's  autonomy  and  control
over  project  evaluation  and  imposes  an administrative  cost  on the
Government.  There  are two  ways  of responding  to this. First,  the
Government  could  streamline  the  approval  system  through  clarifying  and
publicizing  the  criteria  and  giving  decisions  and  handling  appeals  more
quickly. Second,  there  could  be a  shift  of some  of the  burden  of project
evaluation  from  government  committees  to  financial  institutions,  utilizing
the  technical  capability  and  skills  that  already  exist  in the  financial
system. The latter  is  advocated  here:  there  has  been  little  progress  in
streamlining  investment  decision-making  in the  past  few  years  and  such  a
shift  would  free  up the  time  of  Government  officials  in  favor  of a greater
focus  on strategic  questions  in industrial  policy.
6.14  If  project  appraisal  is  to  be shifted  te-ard  the  financial
system,  its  role  as an allocator  of foreign  exchange  would  be extended.
This  would  go  beyond  the  relatively  limited  activities  of ZDB  and  udc.
This  is closely  related  to the  proposal  in (B)  above  to undertake  external
borrowing  for  the  purposes  of  private  sector  investment;  this  could  be
undertaken  in the  form  of lines  of credit  for  on-lending  to  private
businesses. However,  as  noted  in  Chapter  5,  such  a shift  would  also  need
to take  account  on the  Government's  decision  on any  overall  reform  of the
foreign  exchange  allocation  system.
6.15  This  leads  to a  more fundamental  question  of how to  deal  with
government  investment  priorities  in  the  event  of some  combination  of a
shift  in  appraisal  to  the  financial  system  and,  for  example,  movement  to  a
tariff-based  system  of protection.  Two  approaches  are  recommended.  First,
it  would  be appropriate  for  large  projects,  of strategic  significance  to
the  country,  to  continue  to  be subject  to  specific  government  approval.
This  could  be  handled  in the  form  of a cutoff  in investment  size  below
which  specific  approval  would  not  be required. Second,  government  policy
could  continue  to require  some  negative  restrictions  (e.g.  on selected
excluded  areas)  and  positive  biases  (e.g.  on regional  policy  and  employment
creation). The  former  could  be handled  by regulations  that  investment
approvals  would  have to satisfy,  backed  by some  monitoring  of the  approval- 53 -
process. The  alternative,  of  keeping  a committee  for  final  approval  of a
project,  runs  the  major  risk  of  maintaining  the  existing  cumbersome  system
of approval. Positive  biases  are  less  easy  to  handle  through  microeconomic
interventions  (whoever  handles  the  appraisal  process). In  the  vidw of this
paper  it  would  be preferable  to  place  greater  reliance  on indirect
measures,  for  example  through  tax  policy  and  a  more  pro-employment
regulatory  policy,  to further  these  objectives.
D.  Financial  Sector  DeveloDment
6.16  Despite  the  depth  of the  financial  system,  its  role  in investment
finance  has been  limited. The  problem  does  not  lie  with the  financial
sector's  infrastructure--ii:  has  a  wide range  of institutions  and  a  well-
established  capital  market. But  there  are  a number  of symptoms  of an
insuffiLlently  active  role  in investment:  the  stock  market  has  experienced
only  a limited  number  of  new issues  since  independence  and  appears  to  be
substantially  undervalued;  the  corporate  bond  market  is  undeveloped,  and
long-term  corporate  borrowing  aplears  to  be entirely  limited  to  private
placements;  and the  financial  system  as a  whole  has  a  predominant
orientation  toward  financing  'blue-chip"  companies. If the  financial
sector  is to  play  a larger  role  in investment  appraisal  and  finance,  there
will  be a  need to  encourage  more  venture  capital  activities  (including  the
finance  of  new  black  entrepreneurs),  risk-spreading  techniques,  a
strengthening  of the  corporate  side  of the  capital  market,  including  the
stock  exchange,  and  a strengthening  of the  system's  appraisal  capability.
The  Government  fully  recognizes  that  the  financial  sector  could  play  a more
active  role  in the  economy  and  is  currently  engaged  in  an internal  review
of the  capital  market  and  monetary  policy.
6.17  Given  the  underlying  strength  of the  financial  system,  its
further  development  is likely  to  be most  effectively  encouraged  through  a
combination  of increased  investment  demand  and  allowing  a relatively
unrestricted  response  of the  sector. The  demand  side  is  central:  once  the
corporate  sector  places  more  demands  on the  system,  new techniques  and
institutions  will develop. The  active  response  of the  merchant  banks  to
the  financial  opportunities  presented  by disinvestment  in  1987-88  provides
strong  evidence  for  this. But  some  shaking  up of the  system  would  also  be
desirable:  it is currently  nicely  protected  and  profitable  and  the
Government  could  encourage  the introduction  of  new techniques  and
institutions,  rather  than  placing  an overriding  emphasis  on the  stability
that  leads  to a sharing  out  of the  substantial  available  profits  from
intermediation.  This  could  also  involve  allowing  new  entrants  into  the
system  or diversi.fication  of existing  institutions  to  put  pressure  on
established  institutions  to  move into  areas  of  higher  risk.  This  needs  to
be done  with  attention  to the  regulatory  and  monitoring  capabilities  of the
system--in  Kenya  a rapid  expansion  in  non-bank  financial  intermediaries  in
the  early  1980s  certainly  took  the  sector  into  areas  of longer-term  credit
and  greater  risk,  but ran  into  problems  with  many  of the  new institutions
having  to close  with  bad  debts. Greater  initial  regulation  may  have  been
justified.
6.18  If the  Government  shifts  some  of the  burden  of investment
appraisal  to the  financial  sector,  it  is recommended  that  this  not  be- 54  -
restricted  to  a  limiteu  number  of  institutions  (such  as  ZDB),  since  one  of
the  purposes  is  to  encourage  competition  and  innovation  on  the  financial
side,  involving  both  private  and  public  institutions.  However,  ZDB,  and
public  financial  institutions  in  general,  are  likely  to  continue  to  have  an
important  role  to  play.  There  are  three  reasons  for  this.  First,  project
appraisal  techniques  in  many  financial  institutions  may be  relatively  weak
and  ZDB in  particular  could  play  a  leading  role  in  a  transition  phase.  It
may  alsc  be  willing  to  finance  economically  sound,  but  relatively  risky
investments.  Second,  in  view  of  the  general  perceived  risks  of  doing
business  in  Zimbabwe,  private  corporations  may  view  participation  of  public
sector  finance,  whether  in  the  form  of  loans  or  equity,  as  a  risk-spreading
factor  in  a  new  investment.  This  should  not,  however,  be  a  requirement,
since  many  in  the  private  sector  appear  to  consider  that  public  involvement
increases  rather  than  reduces  risk.  Third,  attention  needs  to  be  given  to
encouragement  of  investment  by  black  entrepreneurs,  who  may  have  not  have
an  established  track  record.  While  it  would  be  desirable  for  the  private
financial  sector  to  take  some  initiative  in  this  direction,  it  may
initially  be easier  to  encourage  a  public  body,  such  as  SEDCO, to  take  on
the  higher  risks  associated  with  new  and  smaller  entrepreneurs.
6.19  The  development  of  the  stock  exchange  would  also  be  facilitated
by  a  general  improvement  in  corporate  investment  demand.  Government
support  for  its  future  role  in  the  economy  would  be  desirable,  to  encourage
a  broader  participation  both  from  unlisted  companies  and  potential
investors.  As  noted  earlier,  there  is  substantial  potential  for  capital
appreciation  if  the  volume  of  activity  picks  up.  Consideration  may  also  be
given  to  two  factors:  the  encouragement  of  investment  in  shares  by  small
investors  (once  firms  begin  to  make  new  issues),  for  example  by  according
more  generous  tax  treatment  to  dividends  below  a  certain  level;  and  the
desirability  of  some  institutional  strengthening  of  the  market  Technical
Assistance  may  be  useful  here.
6.20  Interest  rate  policy  is,  of  course,  relevant  to  the  financial
sector.  Interest  rates  for  corporations  are  not  directly  controlled,  but
they  have  been  relatively  low  in  real  terms  owing  to  weak  credit  demand.
This  is  likely  to  change  with  a  rise  in  credit  demand  from  the  corporate
sector  following  an  investment  recovery.  This  would  not  be  undesirable,  if
it  reflects  sustainable  macroeconomic  conditions  and  is  not  a  consequence
of  an  excessive  budget  deficit.  As  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  the  interest
rate  has  only  been  a  minor  influence  on  the  cost  of  capital  in  the  past.
Increases  would  hopefully  be  more  than  offset  by  reductions  in  perceived
risks  (thereby  reducing  the  cost  of  equity  finance)  and  in  the  relative
price  of  capital  goods  following  some  relaxation  of  the  foreign  exchange
restriction  on  imported  capital  goods.  In  view  of  the  conclusion  that
other  factors  dominate  the  determination  of  investment  demand,  this  paper
is  not  too  concerned  about  any  dampening  effect  due  to  interest  rate  rises.
Indeed  an  increased  role  for  the  financial  sector  in  investment  appraisal
would  be  consistent  with  a  greater  role  for  interest  rates  in  investment
decision-making.
6.21  On the  other  hand,  the  Government's  intervention  to  reduce
interest  rates  on  surplus  funds  of  foreign-held  corporations  from  ten  to- 55 -
five  percent  is  not  justified. The  intention  is  understandable,  to reduce
the  return  on financial  investments  and  thereby  encourage  firms  to invest
in  physical  assets. However,  all  the  evidence  indicates  that  low  fixed
investment  by foreign  companies  is  not  due  to attractive  alternative
domestic  financial  investments.  The  net result  of the  policy  has  been to
transfer  profits  from  the  non-financial  corporate  sector  to the  financial
institutions  fortunate  enough  to  have their  deposits. The  Government's
decision  to tax  these  windfall  banking  profits  is  justified  in this  light,
but it  would  be preferable  to  remove  the  control  over  this  interest  rate:
this  would  have  beneficial  effects  on  business  confidence  at  no real  cost
to the  country.
6.22  Finally,  firms  that  use  the  new  facility  to  cover  foreign
exchange  risk  will  face  higher  charges  on the  finance  of the  foreign
component  of investment.  This is  likely  to  be substantially  offset  by the
reduction  in  perceived  risks,  i.e.,  this  is  an example  of an intervention
that  improves  expected  future  profits,  without  having  to raise  current
profits  (it  actually  lowers  them  slightly).
E.  Complementary  Regulators  Issues
6.23  Two  areas  of regulation--job  security  regulation  and  price/wage
setting--are  probably  of equal  significance  to investment  regulation  for
private  investment.  Both  tend  to  reduce  investment,  not through  slowing
the  decision-making  process.  but through  increasing  the  perceived  risks  of
investment.
6.24  Job  securitv  regulation.  fi/ The  strong  job security  regulations
(that  require  government  approval  for  dismissal  of employees)  have  two
effects  of relevance  here.  First,  permanent  labor  becomes  more  like  a
fixed  cost  of  production,  that  cannot  be adjusted  in  the  event  of
fluctuations  or shortfalls  in sales. This increases  the  probability  of
temporary  or  permanent  declines  in  prefitability  and  so increases  the
economic  risks  associated  with  an investment  decision. Second,  it
increases  the  effective  cost  of labor,  thereby  encouraging  investments  that
reduce  labor  use.  Thus  job security  regulations  tend  to reduce  overall
investment  and  impart  a labor-saving  bias  on the investment  that  does
occur.
6.25  The  experience  since  1980  provides  evidence  for  these  effects  in
Zimbabwe. An econometric  analysis  indicates  that  labor  demand  was  below
what it  would  have  been in  the  absence  of the  regulations  for  most
industries.  ii/  It  also  shows  the  strongest  negative  effect  on employment
in the  more rapidly  expanding  subsectors,  indicating  relatively  high
I/  This  was  discussed  in  the  1987  CEM,  and  it  has  been further  analyzed  in
follow-up  work  by Fallon  and  Lucas  (1989).
1_/  ibid.  This empirical  work indicates  that the long-run  reduction  in
employment  due  to the  regulations  could  be over  20  percent  on average,
compared  to  a situation  without  the  regulations.- 56 -
investment  in  those  activities  that  were  able  to expand  in  a labor-saving
direction,  reducing  the  risks  associated  with the  labor  regulations.  The
objective  of protecting  the  incomes  of  workers  is desirable. However,  it
would  be preferable  to  do this  in  ways that  did  not  depress  investment
(that  is  necessary  for  any  employment  growth)  nor  imparted  such  strong
incentives  for  labor-saving  investments.  Compensation  schemes,  for  example
based  on the  period  of time  working  with a firm,  combined  with  an active
re-training  policy,  for  example  through  courses  for  laid-off  workers  at the
technical  colleges,  would  be preferable.
6.26  It  was announced  in  late  1988  that  the  Government,  following
consultations  with  both industry  and  union  groups,  is  considering  changes
in the  1985  Labor  Relations  Act.  This  could  involve  a relaxation  of the
job security  regulation  and  an  extension  of the  currently  highly  restricted
right  to strike, This  appears  to  reflect  both the  private  sector's
emphasis  on the  constraints  imposed  by the  current  restrictions  and  a
possible  shift  in  the  stance  of the  Government  vis-a-vis  the  labor  movement
to allow  a greater  role  for  unions.
6.27  Price  and  wage  2olicv. The  price  freeze  that  was initiated  in
mid-1987  appears  to  have  squeezed  profits  in  many  activities.  However,  the
frequently  voiced  complaints  of the  corporate  sector  over  price  and  wage
controls  are  less  compelling  than  other  factors  in  explaining  weak
investment  demand. If  anything,  the  Government  has  managed  price  and  wage
policy  since  1982  in  a manner  that  tends  to guarantee  profits,  through
allowing  cost  increases  to  be passed  on in  prices--and,  as the  corporate
financial  results  attest,  with quite  a  healthy  impact  on profits  at least
until  1987.  Nevertheless,  there  are  compelling  reasons  for  the
continuation  of  both the  unwinding  of the  price  freeze  and the
complementary  shift  toward  collective  bargaining. First,  this  will allow
the  emergence  of changes  in  relative  prices  and  wage structures,
encouraging  resource  movements  in response  to  changing  patterns  of
scarcity. As is  well  appreciated,  this  is  closely  associated  with trade
policy;  it is  best  undertaken  in the  context  of the  introduction  of foreign
competition  through  a process  of trade  liberalization,  given  the  widespread
monopoly  power  of the  corporate  sector,  should  the  Government  decide  to
pursue  this  route. Second,  it  will reduce  the  costs  imposed  on  both
business  and  the  Government  of preparing,  reviewing,  negotiating  and
appealing  price  applications.  At least  in  public  statements,  the  private
sector  appears  to consider  that  the  price  control  system  increases  the
risks  of fluctuations  in  profits. Sudden  decontrol  may  not  be desirable,
in  view  of widespread  monopolistic  markets  and  the  risks  of a jump in
inflation. However,  judging  by the  public  debate  of the  past few  years,
even  a gradual  move  would  provide  a  valuable  signal  to the  private  sector
in  Zimbabwe  and  contribute  to improved  business  confidence.
F.  Tax  Policy--Corporate  Income  Taxes  and  Indirect  Taxes
6.28  Corporate  tax  Dolicv. Major  changes  in corporate  tax  policy  are
not  required. The  quantitative  analysis  shows  that  the  existing  tax  system
is  quite  favorable  to firms  undertaking  investment.  In particular,  the
policy  of full  expensing  for  machinery  and  equipment  leads  to a sharp
reduction  in  tax  liabilities.  Nevertheless,  the  following  modifications- 57 -
in  tax  policy  are  recommended  for  consideration.
(i) The  major  anomaly  in  the  existing  system  is  the  coexistence
of full  expensing  with interest  deductibility  for  tax  purposes. This,  in
effect,  leads  to giving  a tax  allowance  twice  on the  same  expenditure  (when
it is  debt-financed)  and  is  equivalent  to a subsidy  on investment.  There
is  no case for  this:  it  could  lead  to  excessive  investments  in inefficient
activities.  The  extent  to  which  this  has occurred  in  the  past  is likely  to
be small  in  view  of the  aversion  of the  corporate  sector  to debt  finance.
It is recommended,  nevertheless,  that  interest  deductibility  be removed  if
full  expensing  is  kept. This  would  tend  to  reduce  after-tax  profits  (since
firms  do  borrow  for  working  capital  purposes)  and  it  would  be appropriate
to offset  the  projected  additional  projected  revenue  through  a reduction
(probably  modest)  in  the  average  corporate  tax  rate.  In  view of the  public
visibility  of the  average  rate,  such  a shift  in  tax  structure  could
actually  have  a beneficial  impact  on  business  confidence.
(ii) The  Tax  Commission's  recommendations  on substituting  full
expensing  with accelerated  depreciation  constitute  an alternative  approach,
but  are  not  compelling  if  taken  in isolation:  investment  expensing  is not
intrinsically  a distortionary  form  of tax  allowance  and  review  of this  area
may  not  be a priority  for  attention  of the  scarce  time  of  Ministry  of
Finance  officials. However,  it should  be noted  that  expensing  is  currently
restricted  to  fixed  assets,  and  would  be expected  to  lead  to  excessive
investment  in fixed  relative  to other  forms  of  capital. It  would  be
appropriate  to  revisit  this  question  if the  Government  undertakes  a review
of  the  fundamentals  of the  tax  system  i.e.  whether  to  maintain  the  income-
based  character  of the  existing  system  (as  essentially  recommended  by the
Tax  Commission)  or shift  to  an expenditure-based  approach. In this
context,  it should  be noted  that,  since  capital  income  is  now  weakly  taxed,
the  tax  system  has  already  effectively  moved  in  the  direction  of  an
expenditure-tested approach.
(iii) Some  differentiation  of tax  allowance  policy  could  be
justified  to further  the  Government's  spatial  location  policy,  through
providing  a  more generous  tax  position  for  firms  locating  outside  existing
industrial  centers.
(iv) There  is  little  case  for  the  use  of taxes  or subsidies  as
an instrument  of foreign  investment  promotion. Low  domestic  profits  have
not  been  a feature  of foreign  corporations  and  the  sources  of lack  of
foreign  investment  lie  elsewhere. This is  discussed  in  the  next  section.
6.29  Indirect  taxes. The  recent  trend  in government  policy  has  been
to  attempt  to reduce  the  cost  of investment  through  reduction  in the  cost
of imported  capital  goods. In 1987,  it  was  announced  that  the  customs
surtax  on imported  capital  goods  would  be reduced  from  20 to  15  percent.
Then,  in 1988,  the  possibility  of full  exemption  on all  indirect  taxes  was
announced. At first  sight,  the  results  in  Chapters  2  and  4 on the  impact
of the  cost  of investment  goods  on the  cost  of capital  and  the  rate  of
investment  would  seem  to  provide  support  for  this  approach. However,  there
are  three  reasons  why it is  not  advocated  here.  First,  there  is  a question
of interpretation:  it  is the  judgement  of this  paper  that  the  primary- 58 .
source  of the  rise  in the  cost  of investment  goods  lies  in  the  direct  and
indirect  impact  of the  rationing  of foreign  exchange--on  the  price  of
imported  equipment  and  of domestically  produced  capital  goods  (for  which
price  controls  are  relatively  ineffective).  The  evidence  is limited,  but
if this  is  correct,  reducing  tariffs  will  not  have  any  effect  of
significance,  while  liberalization  of supply  would  reduce  the  relative
price.  Second,  we would  place  greater  emphasis  on other  factors  dampening
investment  demand--if  we return  to the  analysis  of the  cost  of capital,
most importantly  the  factors  that  raise  perceived  risks,  thereby  raising
the  cost  of equity. Third,  reducing  the  tariff  on imported  capital  goods
whilst  maintaining  protection  for  the  domestic  capital  goods  industry  has
the  perverse  effect  of encouraging  relatively  import-intensive  investment
choices  (that  would  exacerbate  the  other  bias toward  capital-intensive
choices  due  to the  labor  regulation  system). The  preferred  choice  would  be
to  have  uniform  treatment  by equalizing  tariffs  for  competing  and  non-
competing  capital  goods.
G.  The  Environment  for  Foreign  Investment
6.30  The  dominance  of foreign  capital  in the  corporate  sector  has  been
a  pervasive  feature  of the  assessment  of the  current  investment  climate.
The  Government  has two  distinct  objectives  vis-a-vis  foreign  capital:  to
increase  national,  and  especially  black,  ownership  of productive  capital;
and  to encourage  investment  by existing  and  new foreign  firms  where  there
are  clear  gains  to the  economy. As discussed  in  Chapter  5, the  development
of an environment  that  furthers  both  objectives  has  been  a difficult  task.
If this  is  to  be successful,  the  key issue  is  a clear  differentiation
between  those  existing  areas  of foreign  ownership  that  the  Government  would
be happy  to see  diluted  and  areas  where  expansion  is  considered  desirable.
This  complements  the  distinction  drawn  in  Chapter  5  between  those  investors
that  have  made a strategic  decision  to leave  whenever  they  can  get
acceptable  terms,  and  those  withi  an established  or  potential  long-term
commitment  to the  economy. It is  then  important  to ensure  that  policies
designed  to deal  with the  former  group  (including  dividend  and
disinvestment  policy)  do  not  worsen  the  environment  for  potential  new
investors,  through  reduced  expected  returns  and increasing  perceived  risks
of investment.
6.31  The  Government  has indeed  pursued  a differentiated  policy  through
according  'venture  capital'  status  to  post-1979  investments:  this,  inter
alia,  has included  the  maintenance  of 50  percent  remittability  of  after-tax
profits  and  more  favorable  provisions  for  disinvestment.  However,  this  has
failed  to  convince  most  new foreign  investors  or the  parent  companies  of
existing  firms. There  appear  to  be three  reasons  for  this:  first,  foreign
investment  procedures  remain  both  restrictive  (e.g.  on categories  of
investment  by existing  foreign  firms  that  might  qualify  for  venture  capital
status)  and  cumbersome;  second,  the  perceived  risks  of investment  are  high-
-in  part  because  the  foreign  investment  community  remains  skeptical--this
was  captured  in  Chapter  4 by the  unusually  high  cost  of equity  for  foreign
firms;  third,  many investment  firms  have  made  a strategic  decision  to
minimize  investments  in Southern  Africa. Nothing  can  be done  about  the
last,  but  some  further  poli,.y  changes  can  facilitate  the  disinvestment
process  while  improving  the  environment  for  new investment.- 59  -
6.32  The  environment  for  new investors.  The  principal  feature  of a
differentiated  policy  should  be a  more favorable  environment  for  potential
new investors--and  potential  new investments  of established  firms. This
appears  to  be the  major  focus  of the  Government's  current  review  of the
framework  for  foreign  investment.  The  general  conclusion  that  current
profits  (at  least  in  Zimbabwe  dollars)  are  not the  key issue  is important
here.  The emphasis  of any  new  initiative  should  not  be on any  generalized
fiscal  incentives,  but  rather  on stronger  assurances  on dividend
remittability  and  disinvestment  procedures  for  investment  approval. The
moves in  the  May 1987  package  of  measures  were an initial  step,  but the
more streamlining  that  should  occur  with the  new  investment  centre  is
highly  desirable. Finally,  consideration  should  be given  to the  role  of
investment  guarantee  facilities,  such  as the  Multilateral  Investment
Guarantee  Agency. Zimbabwe's  decision  not  to sign  any  such  facility  after
independence  is  understandable,  but it  had  an adverse  impact  on  perceptions
of foreign  investors.  Apart  from  the  general  signal  this  will  give,  such
facilities  can  provide  some  comfort  to  potential  investors  on their  key
concern  of maintaining  access  to  dividends  from  their  investment.
6.33  Improvement  in the  foreign  investment  regime  is important,  but
high expectations  on  new inflows  would  be inappropriate,  even  with  a  highly
favorable  regime. The global  shifts  in  the  direction  of international
investment  have  been to the  OECD  and  East  Asian  countries,  driven  by long-
term  perceptions  over  profitability  and  stability. By ccntrast,  Africa  in
general,  and  Southern  Africa  in  particular,  is  viewed  as  a region  of  high
strategic  risk. Add to this  a widespread  tendency  in developing  countries
(from  Mexico  to  Nigeria)  to liberalize  their  foreign  investment  regimes  and
a rising  interest  in  the  implications  of tte  planned  internal
liberalization  of the  EEC  in 1.992,  and  the  prospects  for  generalized
for*igr,  investment  inflows  are  not  encouraging.  The  major  benefits  for
Zimbabwe  are  likely  to  lie  in the  effects  on the  overall  environment  for
private  investment  and in  attracting  selected  foreign  investment  into
specialized  areas.
6.34  Managing  disinvestment.  Parts  of the  foreign  investor  community
are  willing  to  disinvest  at apparent  discounts  of the  order  of 70  percent
in  return  for  repatriation  of the  proceeds  over  one  to two  years. The
Government  has  allowed  this  to  occur  on a case-by-case  basis  in the  past
two  of three  years. This  policy  allows  Zimbabwe  to  purchase  productive
capital  at  knock-down  prices,  as  well  as support  the  transfer  to domestic
groups  (the  transactions  are  reportedly  only  allowed  if  the  purchasing
group  involves  either  substantial  state  or  black  participation).  However,
apart  from  the  possibility  of asset-stripping,  it runs  the  risk  of
weakening  the  business  environment  through  the  perception  that  this
represents  a  measure  of the  value  of foreign  capital  in  Zimbabwe,  implying
future  expected  returns  should  be similarly  discounted.  It is  the  view of
this  report  that  this  is  misleading:  the  substantial  discounts  are  not a
reflection  of a discount  on equity  per  se,  but on the  restrictions  on
capital  outflows  for  the  past  three  decades  and  the  sharp  discount  on
foreign  currency  transactions  for  a select  group  of foreign  owners  of
capital. An additional  factor  is  that  increased  state  ownership  can  bring
both  direct  costs  and  fears  of pressures  for  future  sales  to the  state.- 60  -
6.35  It is recommended  that  the  Government  continue  to allow
disinvestment  at a  discount  at an overall  pace  dictated  by indicative
aggregate  external  and  financial  programming,  but that  it  explores  somewhat
different  procadures.  Two innovations  could  be considered.  First,  a
division  could  be made  between  the  domestic  sale,  which  should  be at a
reasonable  market  price  in  domestic  currency,  and  the  foreign  exchange
transaction  that  would  be at a discount. The  level  of the  discount  could
be set  by the  Government,  as at  present,  or it could  be set  in the  market--
since  these  transactions  are  already  fully  insulated  from  other  foreign
exchange  transactions  in the  economy  there  are  no risks  of spillover  into
other  areas. This approach  would  signal  that  the  discounts  do not  derive
from  the  low  long-term  value  of capital  stock,  but the  foreign  exchange
constraint  and  excess  dimand  for  capital  outflows. It  could  be appropriate
for  the  state  (e.g.  via the  Reserve  Bank)  to  be involved  as an
intermediary,  capturing  some  of the  substantial  rents  involved  in  the
transactions.  Second,  it  would  be desirable  to encourage  a combination  of
established  and  new institutions  to  broaden  local  participation  in  the  new
domestic  companies,  wherever  possible  involving  the  Stock  Exchange. This
could  also  support  thz  Government's  other  objective  of encouraging  a
greater  role  far  the  capital  market  in  the  economy,  especially  if this  is
associated  uith  measures  to attract  small  investors  into  the  exchange.
6.36  SWaDs  and  new investments.  To complement  general  policy  on
foreign  investment,  Government  could  also  consider  use  of special
mechanisms  for  swapping  foreign-held  assets  in Zimbabwe  for  new investment.
Classic  debt-equity  swaps  would  probably  be undesirable--the  Government
has,  at some  cost,  maintained  its  creditworthiness  through  a good  record  of
servicing  its  debt;  indications  of  value-impaired  debt  in the  market  could
jeopardize  this. However,  schemes  allowing  discounted  swaps  of  blocked
funds,  surplus  funds,  convertible  bonds  or existing  equity  for  new  foreign
investment  should  avoid  this  problem--these  categories  of foreign  liability
have  been effectively  value-impaired  for  decades. In  addition,  there  are
two  potentially  important  benefits  that  are  entirely  consistent  with
current  policy  toward  foreign  investment:  first,  swaps  could  support  the
change  in the  composition  of foreign  capital,  from  investors  only
interested  in short-run  profits  and  getting  out  on the  least  unfavorable
terms,  to investors  with  an interest  in  long-run  profits  and therefore  in
investing  in Zimbabwe;  and,  second,  they  could  attract  foreign  risk  capital
and  expertise  into  areas  that  badly  need  it.  As suggested  in the  May  1988
Conference  of the  Chamber  of  Hines,  a good  initial  candidate  for  this  would
be gold  exploration. This  could  be cast  as a special  case  and the  response
to a scheme  could  be explored  without  commitment  to  a more  generalized
approach.- 61  -
Annex  I
n  _rIvatfnn  of  thn  Cost  of  bapitAl
1.  This annex  draws  on the  modern  theory  of optimal  business  investment
behavior  to  derive  an  equation  for  the  cost  of capital  services  (rental  price
of capital)  for  the  non-financial  corporate  sector  of the  Zimbabwean  economy.
The  cost  of capital  services  refers  to  the  cost  of using  one  unit  of capital
for  a specified  period  of time,  i.e.,  one  year.  It  depends  not only  on the
cost  of funds  and the  cost  of asset  decay,  but  also  on the  benefits  of tax
provisions  for  businesses'  depreciations  and  for  deductibility  of interest
expenses. Also, the  determination  of the  cost  of capital  relies  on the
interaction  between  inflation  and  taxes. To the  extent  that  interest  payments
which  are  deductible  against  corporate  income  taxes  are  in  part  payments  of
the  principal,  the  real  cost  of capital  is  reduced. This  positive  aspect  of
inflation  is,  however,  often  offset  by the  historical  cost  base  depreciation
rules,  which  do not  fully  compensate  the  companies  for  higher  replacement  cost
of capital.
2.  In Zimbabwe  the  current  tax  code  allows  for  full  expensing  of
business  investment  outlays. This  allows,  in essence,  busir,esses  to
capitalize  depreciation  allowances  to the  maximum  level,  which  is  $1 for  each
$1 of  new investment  in  machinery  and  equipment. Furthermore,  interest
payments  are  completely  tax  deductible.  These  provisions  are  quite  important.
Their  influences  are  explicitly  incorporated  in the  cost  of capital  derived
below.
3.  Analytically,  the  derivation  of the  cost  of capital  is  facilitated  by
focusing  on the investment  decision  from  the  perspective  of the  equity  holder.
Consider  then  an investment  in  a  project  costing  Pk at the  time  of
acquisition. If a proportion,  b, of that  investment  is financed  through  debt,
and  if the  statutory  corporate  income  tax  rate  is  u, the  shareholder's  share
of the  original  investment  outlays,  will  be (l-uz-b)  Pk.  For  the  project  to
be viable,  this  must  be equal  to the  present  value  of the  stream  of rat
income;  more formally,
Pk(l-uz-b)  - f  exp(-(p  +  6)t)  [(l-u)q.P.  - ((1-u)  r  +  (6-x))  b. Pk+uzPk]  dt..l
where: q  - real  user  cost  of  capital
Py  - price  of output
p  - required  rate  of  return  on  equity  (nominal)
6  - rate  of depreciation
r  - nominal  rate  of interest
x  - rate  of inflation
z  - present  value  of depreciation  allowances
4.  Solving  equation  (1)  for  the  real  cost  of  capital,  q,  yields:
q  p  ((  +6X..  - _  [(l-u)r  +  xbl .......................  2
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where  p is  the  real  required  rate  of return  on equity,  i.e.
P  oPX
where  4k  is the  rate  of inflation  in the  price  of  capital  goods.
5.  Given  that  businesses  in  Zimbabwe  are  permitted  to  deduct  fully  their
purchase  of fixed  assets  against  their  current  tax  income,  z will  be equal  to
the  ratio  of total  fixed  assets  to total  capital  i.e.,
a  Fixed  assets
Fixed  assets+Inventories
Thus,  the  final  form  for  the  real  cost  of capital  will  be:3./
q  t  (Pi +  6)  1-au-  o-  (1 - u) r + x *b
Py  1-u  1  - u
6.  This equation  was  applied  to the  Zimbabwean  data,  incorporating  the
following  assumptions:
(i)  A,  the  real  required  return  on equity  taken  to  be 6 percent  for
local  companies  and  10  percent  for  foreign  companies. For  the  local  companies
this  estimate  is  consistent  with the  average  (1980-87)  return  on their  equity,
after  making  adjustment  for  inflation-induced  depreciation  irh  the  real  value
of debt.  For  foreign  companies,  an additional  4 percentage  points  of risk
premium  was added
(ii)  8,  economic  depreciation  assumed  to  be 5 percent.
jfi/  z-azl+(l-a)Z 2
Where  z1 and  Z2  are  respectively  the  present  value  of depreciation
allowances  on fixed  assets  and  on inventories.  Under  the  prevailing  SIA
provision  in  Zimbabwe,  zI-l  and  Z2-0-- 63  -
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